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Abstract
During the Great Recession, liquidity did not flow out of the banking sector but transferred
internally. Deposits increased, but the volumes of all other short-term debt financing instru-
ments except for T-Bills decreased. Commercial banks, which have stable funding sources
from deposits, did not render liquidity backup to shadow banks but held the increased de-
posits as cash on hand. This paper uses deposits and financial commercial paper outstanding
as proxies for commercial and shadow banking financing instruments because they are unique
liabilities of commercial and shadow banks, respectively. I provide evidence that when liq-
uidity falls in shadow banks, commercial banks experience funding inflows. In normal times,
commercial banks render liquidity backup to shadow banks in the following weeks using the
increased deposits. However, the dynamic correlation breaks down in crisis times.
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1 Introduction
Shadow banks, the specialized financial intermediaries that channel funding from lenders to bor-
rowers through a range of securitization and secured funding techniques1, arguably played a critical
role in undermining the whole financial system and bringing about the financial crisis from 2007 to
2008. In terms of the liability side of the balance sheet, unlike regulated commercial banks which
are mainly and uniquely funded by deposits, shadow banks are primarily funded by issuing fixed-
income securities in wholesale money markets. During the Great Depression, investors responded
to the banking crisis by withdrawing deposits from commercial banks and holding the cash on
hand. The ratio of deposits to currency plunged from about 12 to less than 5 between 1929 and
1933 (Schwartz (1963)). Hence, most old school studies about bank runs are highly focused on
commercial banks. When there is a substantial and rapid decrease in deposits, commercial banks
suffer high pressure in liquidity risks, and in the worst cases, asset liquidation in fire-sale price
could happen. During the Great Recession, shadow banks suffered a similar experience to com-
mercial banks in the Great Depression. The funds of shadow banks plunged because of the collapse
of wholesale money markets. Shadow banks expected they could continuously issue fixed-income
securities to raise money like deposits of commercial banks. However, investors lost confidence
in the wholesale money markets, making it difficult for shadow banks to reissue their securities as
they matured. As a result, the funds of shadow banks dried up when the outstanding levels of the
fixed-income securities they issued shrank rapidly. The refinancing risks become the severe liq-
uidity risks in a way that shadow banks had to find alternative channels to raise funds or liquidate
their assets. After 2008, most of the literature concentrates on the collapse of two important fixed-
income products: repurchase agreements (henceforth repos) and asset-backed commercial paper
1This definition closely follows that of Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010). Although there exists plenty
of borrowing and lending business within the banking system, lenders and borrowers are outsiders of the banking
system in this paper unless otherwise stated. Lenders are mainly fixed-income investors who invest in mortgage-
backed securities, asset-backed securities, repurchase agreements, commercial paper, money market mutual funds,
etc., but not bank deposits or other commercial bank obligations. Investors in mutual funds or hedge funds could be
generally considered lenders if the mutual fund or hedge fund invests in the fixed-income products above. Borrowers
include (but are not limited to) producers who need funds to produce or consumers who need funds to invest in real
estate or purchase automobiles. Borrowers may borrow money from shadow banks directly or from commercial banks,
and commercial banks securitize the loans later as fixed-income products. For details, see Section 2.
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(henceforth ABCP)2. Gorton and Metrick (2012) document a systematic run on one segment of
bilateral repo markets. Both repo spreads and repo haircuts jumped up during the Great Recession.
Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2014) point that the run on the tri-party repo market is more like
the one in traditional commercial banks, which means the run is concentrated on some specific
shadow banks (e.g. Lehman Brothers) but not system-wide. Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013)
analyze the collapse of ABCP markets in 2008 and conclude that most losses of ABCP conduits are
undertaken by the sponsors (large financial institutes) but not outside investors. Although shadow
banks faced severe funds shortage during the Great Recession, commercial banks had a distinct
experience this time. Deposits increased dramatically as investors sought a safe haven for their
money.
This paper studies the interdependence between shadow banks and commercial banks. They
offer similar financial products to investors. The fixed-income products offered by shadow banks
have a higher interest rate and risks than deposits. Hence, they are competitors to attract the most
risk-averse investors3. When the market risks increase, investors hold fewer securities issued by
shadow banks and more deposits, and vice versa. One example is during the Great Recession, when
investors lost confidence in the securities offered by shadow banks and transferred their wealth
from shadow banks to commercial banks. Hence, commercial banks have a unique and natural
advantage in providing liquidity insurance to shadow banks if they want. Consider a case where
investors withdraw funds from shadow banks and deposit them into commercial banks during a
period of market stress. If commercial banks lend the same volume of funds to shadow banks
and all transactions work efficiently, no liquidity problem comes up in the whole banking system.
Money just behaves like ”what goes around comes around”. Investors still hold the same wealth in
the whole banking system if only they keep the same amount of fixed-income investment. Shadow
banks cannot raise enough money from investors, but they find an alternative funding source from
2Other studies are concerned with runs on money market mutual funds. In this paper, I treat money market funds
as investors like Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) because money market funds are the main investors in repos
and commercial paper. In addition, little money flows from money market funds directly to outside borrowers. Hence,
it is better to see money market funds as outside lenders but not shadow banks to avoid double counting errors. For
details, see Section 2.
3Compared to the investors who invest in equities, real estate and so on.
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commercial banks. For commercial banks, deposit inflows serve as a hedge for outflows from new
loans given to shadow banks. I give the series of cash flows a name called ”Flight-to-Quality”
circle (henceforth FTQ circle) which is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Flight-to-Quality Circle
The FTQ circle consists of blue links 2©, 3© and 4©. The blue links 2© and 3© represent the
fact that securities issued by shadow banks and deposits are substitutes. The blue link 4© happens
later and is the key to the success of the FTQ circle. It represents that commercial banks lend
increased deposits from the link 3© to shadow banks. The FTQ circle is not totally new and it
follows the spirit of Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002), and Gatev and Strahan (2006). They study
the interdependence between commercial banks and large corporations that issue non-financial
commercial paper (henceforth, CP) to raise money. During the periods of market stress, large
corporations cannot issue enough non-financial CP in the wholesale money market, so they resort
to commercial banks as the last lender by taking down the backup line of the non-financial CP (like
the link 4©).
In this paper, I argue that the FTQ circle is vulnerable to resist strong market impact and it only
works when the link 4© happens. During normal times or periods of moderate market stress, the
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FTQ circle functions well as commercial banks are willing to lend increased deposits to shadow
banks through the link 4©. However, the link 4© broke down during the Great Recession and it
could possibly be one of the reasons that caused the collapse of shadow banking system4.
Why is the link 4© in the FTQ circle important to the stability of the financial system? My
argument is that the liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks is the radical support
for the confidence of investors when the financial market suffers the impact of credit risks. The
securities offered by shadow banks usually have collateral to protect investors from credit risks, so
they were considered to be safe assets before the Great Recession5. Based on the shadow banking
model of Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013), fixed-income investors are extremely risk-averse.
Hence, investors value the risky collateral at a much lower price than the risk-neutral financial
intermediaries. The collateral is priced nearly risk-neutral during normal times because of the
liquidity offered by banks. Even if investors dislike risks, they can accept collateral at about its risk-
neutral price because they believe that they can sell their collateral in a liquid market dominated
by risk-neutral banks if defaults happen. When moderate neglected credit risks are revealed in the
market, investors ask for more collateral and higher interest rate to offset the credit risks, and the
market price of the collateral temporarily decreases because of the underlying fundamental return
rates based on the credit risks. However, we are still in a nearly risk-neutral world if the market
has sufficient liquidity. Things change when the neglected credit risks are so large that the link 4©
in the FTQ circle breaks down like it was the case during the Great Recession. The liquidity of
the market declined largely due to the fact that commercial banks tighten their credit. Investors
lose their confidence and reveal their extreme risk-averse preferences. Collateral is priced with a
high risk premium because investors dominate the market this time. Risk-neutral arbitrageurs do
not have sufficient funds to turn the market back to the nearly risk-neutral state individually. The
market stays a long time with extreme risk-averse pricing before it goes back to risk-neutral again.
4According to the forecast model in this paper based on financial CP, the link 4© broke down from Sep. 2007 to
Apr. 2009. For details, see Section 4.
5It is the reason we usually call them asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities. For repos, investors have even
more controls over the collateral than normal collateralized borrowings. Collateral is exempted from the automatic
stay, so a party to a repo can unilaterally enforce the termination provisions of the agreement as a result of a bankruptcy
filing by the other party. For details, see Section 2.
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My research differs from the existing literature in that it studies the liquidity risks based on
concurrent and dynamic correlations between commercial banks and shadow banks (the FTQ cir-
cle). Studies before the Great Recession are mostly focused on runs on commercial banks, which
is the black link 1© in Figure 1. By contrast, when crises occur today, we observe increases in
deposits, which are the blue link 3© in Figure 16. The introduction of deposit insurance could
probably explain the reverse cash flows in the links 1© and 3©. I also find that (uncovered) large
time deposits behave more like the securities offered by shadow banks. Studies after the Great Re-
cession are mostly focused on runs on shadow banks, which is the blue link 2© in Figure 1. There
also exists some literature that studies how runs on shadow banks (the link 2©) can undermine
the regulated commercial banking system because they are closely related in reality. However, no
study proposes the runs that come from the breakdown of the link 4© in the FTQ circle.
Although there exists a large number of independent shadow banks, commercial banks and
shadow banks are organizationally connected in two different frames. First, commercial banks
themselves are not pure. Commercial banks are funded not only by deposits, but also through
shadow banking channels. For example, repos are typical fixed-income products offered by shadow
banks (mostly dealer banks) to raise money. However, commercial banks can also use them for
financing like deposits. The amount funded by repo as a percentage of total assets of commercial
banks from April 1, 2008, to February 29, 2009, was 63 basis points (mean) and the median was
2.7% (Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2010)). It is very small but still exists. Harvey and Spong
(2001) point that growth in traditional deposit funding sources has stagnated at many commer-
cial banks after 1990 and has largely failed to keep up with the growth in bank assets. Hence,
commercial banks which face funding difficulties in core deposits have to use funding instruments
from shadow banking activities. Obviously, the runs on shadow banking activities can influence
the commercial banks directly in such a way. Second, commercial banks and shadow banks can
have the same parent company. In the United States, commercial banks are held by bank holding
companies (henceforth, BHCs), which can have shadow banking subsidiaries. Copeland (2012)
6Not only during the Great Recession. According to Gatev and Strahan (2006), the deposits increased when the
market suffered liquidity shocks from 1988 to 2002.
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points out that shadow banking subsidiaries of BHCs have been increasing over time and represent
a quantitatively important share of the BHCs’ total earnings. For example, ABCP conduits are
special purpose vehicles sponsored by large financial institutions, which are mostly BHCs7. In
January 2007, commercial banks (BHCs) accounted for $903 billion or 74.8% of ABCP outstand-
ing. Among them, the largest BHC sponsoring ABCP conduits in the United States was Citigroup,
with 16 conduits and $92.6 billion of ABCP outstanding. According to Acharya, Schnabl, and
Suarez (2013), regulatory arbitrage was an important motive that BHCs set up ABCP conduits.
ABCP conduits are off-balance sheet financing for commercial banks. Although BHCs need to
satisfy capital requirements based on consolidated balance sheets, they could enjoy reduced regu-
latory capital if guarantees (they provide to ABCP conduits in order to protect outside investors8)
were skillfully structured before the Great Recession9. Admittedly, there are regulations that re-
quire BHCs to prioritize the interests of their commercial banks. During periods of market stress,
it is difficult to believe that BHCs can stand by while their shadow banking subsidiaries are getting
in trouble. Hence, the runs on shadow banking subsidiaries can influence the commercial banks
indirectly in such a way. Actually, Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) find that most losses of
ABCP conduits are undertaken by the commercial banks instead of outside investors during the
Great Recession.
Because the probable problem of endogeneity lies in the real world as I stated in the last para-
graph, empirical counterparts identified to the FTQ circle need to avoid the conflict of interest
based on the organizational relations. In this paper, I use the volume of deposits but not total lia-
bilities or total assets of commercial banks as the proxy for commercial banks in the FTQ circle
because of its purity. Only commercial banks can legally issue deposits to raise funds and it is the
7A special purpose vehicles or entity is a subsidiary of a company which is protected from the parent company’s
financial risk. Hence, the bankruptcy of the parent company would not jeopardize the subsidiary. In the context of
ABCP, investors do not need to worry about the failure risks of the sponsoring BHC.
8Almost all sponsors provide guarantees to outside investors in ABCP conduits. ABCP has not only backed assets
which play a role like collateral but also guarantees from the sponsors. Hence, they were considered safe investment
even for the extreme risk-averse investors before the Great Recession. For details, see Section 2.
9In June 2009, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) announced the Statements of Financial Account-
ing Standards (FAS) 166 and 167, amending existing accounting rules for the consolidation of securitization transac-
tions. The United States banking agencies clarified in September 2009 that depository institutions (commercial banks)
would have to hold normal regulatory capital against consolidated securitization transactions and ABCP conduits.
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essential difference between commercial banks and shadow banks. A decrease in deposits means
commercial banks can only raise fewer funds from the investors and it is the failure of refinancing
of deposits. Although commercial banks can also issue some kinds of shadow banking instruments
to raise funds, they are usually not allowed to issue financial CP. Hence, I use financial CP out-
standing as the proxy for shadow banks in the FTQ circle given that only shadow banks can legally
issue financial CP to raise funds. A decrease in financial CP outstanding means shadow banks can
only raise fewer funds from the investors and it is the failure of refinancing of financial CP. Albeit
BHCs may use shadow banking subsidiaries to issue financial CP and pass the proceeds down-
stream into commercial banks, the main issuers of financial CP are independent shadow banks
(foreign financial institutions, captive finance companies, and dealer banks) and they are competi-
tors to commercial banks as illustrated in the FTQ circle.
In the analysis at the industry level, I use weekly time series data regarding total deposits of
domestically chartered commercial banks and total financial CP issued in the domestic market to
estimate a series of vector autoregressions (henceforth, VARs). The change of deposits and that of
financial CP outstanding are concurrently negatively correlated all the time. They are substitutes
for fixed-income investors, and the blue links 2© and 3© in the FTQ circle demonstrate the con-
current correlation. In normal times, there is a dynamic correlation between deposits and financial
CP outstanding. An increase in deposits leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding in 1 to
3 weeks. Considering financial CP with an average maturity of about 30 days, it is enough time
for shadow banks to rebuild liquidity. However, the dynamic correlation as shown by the blue link
4© in the FTQ circle disappears in times of market stress. In addition to the Great Recession, the
liquidity backup from the dynamic correlation also broke down from 2010 to 2011 (the peak of the
European sovereign debt crisis), and in the second half of 2014 (the oil prices crash). Given that a
large number of issuers of financial CP are foreign financial institutions headquartered in Europe,
we can easily expect that domestic commercial banks aborted the liquidity backup for them during
the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and 2011. In 2014, after the period of the
shale oil boom in the united states, the oil price slumped by more than 50% since peaking in June.
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There is no doubt that large oil and gas companies suffered severe impact because of the price
crash. Their captive finance companies (subsidiaries), the issuers of financial CP, were therefore
considered too risky to receive liquidity funds by commercial banks.
For BHCs, we can see them as mixtures of commercial banks and shadow banks. There indeed
existed some commercial banks that suffer a severe liquidity impact during the Great Recession.
However, the shortage of liquidity does not come from the deposits, but from the shadow banking
activities in which the commercial banks are involved. When liquidity dried up during the Great
Recession, commercial banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing
could continue to lend compared to other banks (Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011)).
For the example stated above, Citigroup set up most ABCP conduits and we know it was insolvent
in 2008 even if it had received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (henceforth, TARP).
In February 2009, the New York Times reported the following:
”It would seem obvious that helping banks, not holding companies, would be the most
direct way to stimulate bank lending. But when TARP purchased preferred stock and
warrants, it bought them from holding companies, not their bank subsidiaries. While
TARP has been generous with bank holding companies, these companies have not been
so generous with their banks. Four large holding companies (JP Morgan, Citigroup, Bank
of America and Wells Fargo) initially received a total of $90 billion in TARP money in
the fall, but by the end of 2008 they had contributed less than $15 billion in equity capital
to their subsidiary banks10.”
Thus BHCs had larger liquidity problems in their shadow banking subsidiaries than in their com-
mercial banks. It is worth mentioning that although commercial banks can also face liquidity
problems if their deposits increase by less than the reduction in shadow banking securities they
issue, they still have much milder funding problems than independent shadow banks.
The two decades in the run-up to the Great Recession saw the emergence of a large number
10See ”The Bailout Is Robbing the Banks,” John C. Coates and David S. Scharfstein, New York Times, February 17,
2009.
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of independent shadow banks. Some economists call the phenomenon dis-intermediation11. How-
ever, after the Great Recession, we saw the trend toward consolidation of independent shadow
banks in BHCs. Some economists call the migration of independent shadow banks into BHCs re-
intermediation. Cetorelli (2012) shows that, by 2011, BHCs controlled about 38% of assets of the
largest insurance companies, 41% of total money market mutual fund (henceforth, MMMF) assets,
and 93% of the assets of the largest brokers and dealers. Because BHCs have much higher regula-
tion cost and limitations compared to the independent shadow banks, many economists think the
re-intermediation is a paradox and expect more securitization-related activities will migrate from
BHCs to independently run shadow banks over time12. The theory in this paper can partly explain
the re-intermediation paradox after the Great Recession. First, commercial banks are virtual win-
ners in the Great Recession compared to the independent shadow banks because they have stable
funding sources from deposits. The finding of Cetorelli (2012) is direct evidence that how favor-
ably BHCs thrive after the Great Recession. Hence, they had the ability to acquire independent
shadow banks during or after the Great Recession. Second, in addition to that ability, BHCs also
had the incentive to do so according to the FTQ circle. There are synergies for a BHC to hold com-
mercial banks and shadow banks together. Commercial banks serve as a hedge for shadow banks
as the consolidation internalizes the FTQ circle13. If the synergies from liquidity management are
greater than the regulation cost, we can see the re-intermediation. Last but not least, the internal-
ized FTQ circle can only hedge the liquidity risks in the fixed-income market, but cannot eliminate
them. When market credit risks are large enough, the core deposits of commercial banks could be
insufficient to hedge the shadow banking subsidiaries that BHCs hold. Call the case of Citigroup
during the Great Recession. Nowadays, commercial banks play fewer roles in BHCs when they
own more shadow banking subsidiaries. We need to care about not only the capital adequacy but
11For dis-intermediation, only commercial banks are considered intermediaries.
12The re-intermediation is not totally market-oriented. For example, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley received
government bailouts during the Great Recession. In return, they transited into BHCs to abide by more regulations in
2008, even if they did not hold any commercial bank back then.
13The synergy shares the same spirit of Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002). In their study, that commercial banks
take deposits and lend via commitments together can generate synergies in liquidity management between the two
activities because both require banks to hold large balances of liquid assets. The increase in deposits can serve as a
hedge for the take-down of commitments during the crisis times.
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also the core deposits adequacy. Fortunately, liquidity requirements of BHCs have been introduced
in recent years14.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background of shadow banks and
a literature review. In Section 3, I estimate VAR models to provide empirical evidence that the
FTQ circle exists in normal times, but the blue link 4© broke down during the Great Recession.
Total data set is separated into three time periods: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis in advance.
Because the split points that isolate the Great Recession period from the total data time span are
chosen arbitrarily, I let the data itself reveal the exact times that the blue link 4© in the FTQ
circle broke down in Section 4. If the dynamic correlation between deposits and financial CP
outstanding via the blue link 4© exists, past deposits can help improve the prediction of future
financial CP outstanding. Using one-step forward-chaining cross-validation, I find that including
past deposits in the model can significantly increase the accuracy of prediction of financial CP
outstanding measured by the mean squared error except for the times during the Great Recession,
the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis, and the 2014 oil price crash. Section 5 contains the
discussion and conclusions.
2 Shadow Banks and the Great Recession
Where does the liquidity risk of an entity come from? It comes from the refinancing risk when the
entity has to roll over its debt. If an entity has borrowed money from others, it has to pay back the
principal and interest when the loan matures. Most entities plan to keep a stable capital structure
in the long term. They can issue long-term debt to achieve the goal, or issue short-term debt and
reissue it when it matures, doing this over and over until they reach the same long-term goal. If an
entity cannot reissue new debt when the old debt matures, it will experience a passive but obligatory
cash outflow. The cash outflow has more liquidity risks if it is unexpected. For example, a non-
financial company may raise funds for a 5-year investment by rolling over 3-month non-financial
14Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) comes into full effect in 2019. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) was introduced
in 2018.
11
CP or repeatedly getting 3-month loans from commercial banks. If it can successfully roll over its
debt 20 times, it seems as if the company issued 5-year debt for the investment. However, if a credit
crunch happens within 5 years, in which CP investors are not willing to repurchase the security or
commercial banks contract their credit, the company has to find alternative funding sources, or in
the worst case, liquidate the investment. In a way, we observe investors15 withdraw their money
from the company, which has been being lent to the company as debt investment.
Commercial banks are different from normal companies in corporate finance because they have
a unique funding source from deposits. The principle of liquidity risks is totally the same if we
see deposits as the debt of commercial banks. A second example is a commercial bank issuing
3-month time deposits over and over to raise funds. Some investors may not repurchase the new
time deposits when the old ones mature; some investors may continue their time deposits; and
there are some new investors who begin to make time deposits. If the total deposits that investors
keep holding remain relatively steady, the commercial bank will have no liquidity risk. However,
if investors are no longer willing to make the time deposits they have been making, we observe
investors withdraw their money from the commercial banks. Hence, as a matter of fact, runs on a
commercial bank are the bank cannot roll over its deposits.
Generally speaking, the shorter the maturity of the debt, the greater the potential liquidity risk
of the entity because the entity has to roll over its debt more times. The exception is transaction de-
posits, also known as demand deposits. Transaction deposits have infinitely short maturities given
that investors can withdraw them at any time. In other words, commercial banks have to reissue
transaction deposits every second and the investors actually repurchase the deposits every second.
For normal debt financing, it would have the highest refinancing risks and potential liquidity risks
for the issuing entity, due to the extremely short maturity. However, transaction deposits together
with small time deposits are called core deposits16 which are considered the most stable funding
source of commercial banks. When liquidity dried up during the Great Recession, commercial
banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing could continue to lend
15When a commercial bank lends a loan to a company, it is also a debt investor for the company.
16Except for large time deposits, other deposits are core deposits.
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compared to other banks (Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011)).
Shadow banks also have their special kinds of debt financing instruments. The debt financing
instruments are not only liabilities of shadow banks, but also the assets of investors. In plain words,
investors no longer purchase the debt financing instruments which they used to purchase. In ad-
dition to the special funding instruments, shadow banks, and commercial banks also have higher
financial leverage compared to normal companies. Commercial banks usually have 10 times lever-
age. Because of loose regulations, shadow banks can have much higher leverage. For example,
independent primary dealer banks before the Great Recession usually had from 20 to 30 times
leverage17. If an entity cannot roll over its debt, it may experience more liquidity risks if it has
higher leverage. Because the debt issued by shadow banks plunged during the Great Recession,
some literature also calls this phenomenon ”deleveraging”. When literature uses the term ”delever-
aging”, it considers the decrease in debt comes from the supply side (shadow banks)18. The special
mechanisms in shadow banks could make them have to reduce or liquidate a large asset holdings
with only a little decrease of funding19. By contrast, the leverage of the commercial banking sec-
tor increased over the crisis because of the stable funding sources from deposits (He, Khang, and
Krishnamurthy (2010)).
In addition to funding and leverage, the liquidity risks of an entity also depend on its liquid
assets holdings. The more the liquid asset an entity has, the smaller the liquidation cost it suffers.
For example, reducing cash assets holdings in response to a decrease in debt has no liquidation
cost. Moreover, strictly speaking, the refinancing risks depend on the average remaining maturity
of debt but not the average maturity of the debt. For example, in 2007, a company funded by 10-
year bonds or loans with only 1 year left had more potential liquidity risks than another company
funded by 5-year bonds or loans with 4 years left. Hence, we need detailed data regarding all items
on and off the balance sheet of a commercial bank or shadow bank to measure its potential liquidity
17No independent primary dealer bank exists after the Great Recession. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley tran-
sited into BHCs even if they did not hold any commercial bank back then. Lehman Brothers failed. Merrill Lynch and
Bear Stearns were acquired by Bank of America and J.P. Morgan Chase.
18By contrast, when literature uses the term ”runs”, it considers the reduction in debt comes from the demand side
(investors).
19For example, rehypothecation of collateral and haircuts of repos.
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risks. Berger and Bouwman (2009) propose a measure called Liquidity Creation (henceforth, LC)
for commercial banks. LC of a commercial bank is defined as the liquidity of liabilities minus the
liquidity of assets. A commercial bank has large LC if it holds more long-term loans (illiquid) and
is funded heavily by short-term time deposits or transaction deposits (liquid). LC is not precise
to measure liquidity risks in two aspects. First, the liquidity of liabilities is not equivalent to
the instability of them during crisis times. As stated above, core deposits could be highly liquid
and short-term, but they are the most stable funding sources of commercial banks. Second, the
liquidity of assets could change significantly during crisis times. Before the Great Recession, most
short-term fixed-income products issued by shadow banks were considered highly liquid assets by
investors20, but they collapsed over the crisis and investors had large liquidation cost to sell them.
Bai, Krishnamurthy, and Weymuller (2018) construct a measure called Liquidity Mismatch Index
(henceforth, LMI) to evaluate the liquidity risks of BHCs. LMI fixes the problems of LC by giving
liquidity risk weights to all assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items. It is like the risk-based
capital and assets in capital requirements. However, the liquidity risk weights in LMI are not fixed
but matched to the market prices.
In this paper, I use weekly time series data regarding the commercial banking sector and the
shadow banking sector to perform the analysis at the industry level, so it is impossible and un-
necessary to evaluate liquidity risks of any particular bank. I only consider liquidity risks from
the liability side when I evaluate the liquidity risks of commercial and shadow banking sectors.
By definition, commercial banks are different from shadow banks in liabilities. Hence, I define
deposits as the only commercial banking financing instrument to capture the essential difference
between commercial banks and shadow banks. All other short-term debt financing channels except
for treasury bills are shadow banking financing instruments21. Although it is possible to sum all
liquid assets in the commercial banking sector, it may not help improve the measure of liquidity
risks in the sector. We cannot simply add up the liquid assets of each entity to get the liquid buffer
of the whole sector. Moreover, liquidity risks stem from the liability side. Thus, we can reasonably
20Here, investors could be commercial banks or shadow banks.
21Long-term debt financing is related to solvency problems but not liquidity risks.
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think that a decrease in deposits means commercial banks are facing liquidity risks, and a decrease
in shadow banking financing instruments means shadow banks are facing liquidity risks22.
Table 1: Annual U.S. Main Short-Term Debt Financing Instruments ($ billions)
Year
Commercial Repurchase Treasury
Deposits
Agency
Paper Agreements Bills Debentures
2003 1, 341 1, 244 929 4, 095 445
2004 1, 334 1, 518 1, 001 4, 428 566
2005 1, 529 1, 838 961 4, 817 485
2006 1, 806 2, 106 941 5, 181 518
2007 2, 005 2, 427 1, 000 5, 477 832
2008 1, 739 2, 239 1, 861 5, 889 1, 124
2009 1, 303 1, 728 1, 793 6, 548 652
2010 1, 074 1, 717 1, 773 6, 742 567
2011 1, 081 1, 871 1, 521 7, 208 517
2012 993 2, 064 1, 629 7, 944 460
2013 1, 034 1, 932 1, 592 8, 490 533
2014 1, 047 1, 781 1, 458 9, 047 636
2015 1, 028 1, 801 1, 514 9, 657 718
2016 1, 020 1, 788 1, 818 10, 244 552
2017 996 1, 958 1, 956 10, 752 529
2018 1, 088 2, 103 2, 340 11, 170 544
This table reports annual (2003-2018) main debt financing instruments with maturity less than 1 year,
a.k.a. money market financing instruments, except for deposits. Deposits are total deposits of domestically
chartered commercial banks including long-term time deposits and transaction deposits. They are the annual
average value of weekly data obtained from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release. Commercial Paper
outstanding is the annual average value of weekly data obtained from the Federal Reserve’s CP release.
Repurchase Agreements are only tri-party repos. Their annual average collateral value is calculated by
daily data obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The data before 2008 is estimated by the
author. Treasury bills outstanding is the year-end value of monthly data obtained from the U.S. Treasury.
Agency debentures outstanding is the year-end value of quarterly data obtained from Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). The data before 2006 is estimated by the author.
Although this paper only uses financial CP as the proxy for shadow banking financing in formal
regressions, it is beneficial to check total U.S. short-term debt financing instruments, also known
as money market financing instruments, and therefore build a big picture. Table 1 shows annual
(2003-2018) main debt financing instruments with maturity less than 1 year except for deposits.
22Although commercial banks also use shadow banking financing instruments to raise funds and BHCs may have
shadow banking subsidiaries, their funds are mainly from commercial banking financing instruments (deposits).
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Because deposits are the only commercial banking financing instrument and they are most stable
funding sources in crisis times, I list the total deposits in Table 1 which include long-term time
deposits and transaction deposits. Apart from deposits and treasury bills (henceforth T-Bills),
which are issued by the government, agency debentures, CP, and repos are typical shadow banking
financing instruments23. Although repos in Table 1 only contain tri-party repos, and I estimate
data for them before 2008 and data for agency debentures with tenor less than 1 year before 2006
because of unavailability, the data in Table 1 is precise enough to give a big picture24.
All of the instruments had an increasing trend from 2003 to 2007. In 2007, the volume of
total shadow banking financing instruments, the sum of CP, repos and agency debentures, almost
equaled that of total deposits. CP and repos outstanding decreased from 2007 to 2009. The peak
of agency debentures was $1.124 trillion outstanding in 2008, and the volume fell to $652 bil-
lion in 2009, since runs on government-sponsored enterprises (henceforth, GSEs), the issuer of
agency debentures, happened in the last quarter of 2008 and agency debentures in Table 1 use the
last quarter value in each year as the annual data25. Although the volume of all shadow banking
financing instruments decreased during the Great Recession, deposits increased as we expected,
especially from 2008 to 2009. It is worth mentioning that T-Bills increased from $1 trillion in
2007 to $1.861 trillion in 2008. There were many government bailouts during the Great Reces-
sion, so the government needed to raise funds from investors and lent them to financial institutions.
For example, Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) find MMMFs, which are the main investors
in repos, stopped accepting private asset-backed securities as collateral in the tri-party repo market
during the crisis. T-Bills were the most preferred (or sometimes only) collateral that investors were
23Although corporate CP, which belongs to CP, is issued by large non-financial corporations. We can generally see
them as shadow banks with lower leverage.
24According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), in early 2007, total U.S. short-
term debt financing accounted for approximately $5 trillion. CP was the largest instrument in this market with more
than $1.97 trillion outstanding. The second-largest instrument was T-Bills, which accounted for $940 billion outstand-
ing. Other important short-term debt instruments were time deposits and repos. In their statistics, they only consider
short-term deposits and net tri-party repos without general collateral financing (GCF) trades. It is the reason that they
have much fewer deposits and repos than that in my data. The main instruments listed in Table 1 covered most of the
short-term debt financing market back then.
25Actually, repos also peaked in 2008 if we use higher frequency data. Repos outstanding in Table 1 is the annual
average value of daily data.
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willing to accept. The government helped dealer banks to exchange their collateral with T-Bills so
that they could still issue repos over the crisis. Hence, the volume of shadow banking financing
instruments should have been much lower if there had been no bailout. Investors only trusted the
government during the crisis. Only the government and deposits covered by the government could
raise more funds. After the Great Recession, deposits keep increasing but shadow banking financ-
ing instruments remain at a relatively low and constant level. Nowadays, compared to the size of
total deposits, the size of shadow banking financing instruments listed in Table 1 is no longer large.
Do we live in a safer banking sector with more sufficient deposits? No. Many emerging shadow
banks use new shadow banking financing instruments that are not listed in Table 1. In addition,
potential liquidity risks may transfer directly into mutual funds and hedge funds. I will discuss this
in the section of concluding remarks.
Now, let’s take a look at the demand side: investors. Few individual investors invest in shadow
banking financing instruments directly. One of the main investors is MMMFs. According to
regulations, MMMFs can only invest in short-term fixed-income products, so the instruments in
Table 1 cover almost all of the products in the portfolio of MMMFs. MMMFs are also typical
shadow banks, and they experienced runs during the Great Recession. The product issued by
MMMFs to raise funds is also called the MMMF26. After Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, some
MMMF investors withdrew their money from their MMMFs when they realized their MMMFs
were holding financial CP and repos issued by Lehman Brothers. MMMFs had to liquidate some
of their assets listed in Table 1 and they also adjusted their portfolios. They reduced their holdings
of CP and repos, and expanded that of T-Bills, agency debentures, and deposits. If I treat MMMFs
as another shadow banking financing instrument, it will double count the money that flows from
outside into the shadow banking system. MMMFs are investors in the FTQ circle. They withdrew
their money from shadow banks and put it into commercial banks like the blue links 2© and 3©
in the FTQ circle during the Great Recession. In addition to MMMFs, general mutual funds and
hedge funds may also invest small parts of their funds into shadow banking financing instruments.
26For funds, the money they raise is not like debt or equity. For details, see the section of concluding remarks.
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Large corporations can purchase shadow banking financing instruments to manage their liquidity
assets. Hence, individual investors can indirectly invest in shadow banking products by holding
MMMFs (mainly), mutual funds and equity of large non-financial companies.
Table 2 shows the liquid financial assets of individual investors and their share of total27. Ac-
cording to their share of the total, equity and mutual funds bottomed out and all fixed-income
assets peaked in 2008. It may be partly caused by the larger decline in the market value of equity
compared to that of fixed-income securities. Anyway, the market value of all fixed-income assets
increased from 2007 to 2008, which demonstrates that individual investors did not transfer their
funds from fixed-income investments to the other investments during the Great Recession. Individ-
ual investors increased their holdings of MMMFs over the crisis, so in total, institution investors
could be the main trigger of runs on MMMFs28. The jump in the value of corporate bonds from
$1.195 trillion in 2007 to $2.150 trillion in 2008 is more likely from the supply side. Corporations
had difficulties issuing short-term CP and getting loans from commercial banks over the crisis, so
they resorted to issuing long-term bonds. Owing to the high interest rate, individual investors were
willing to keep more bonds for corporations that still have good fundamentals.
2.1 Shadow Banks
In this subsection, I concisely introduce the typical shadow banks discussed in this paper. Because
this paper studies the liquidity risks of shadow banks, the introduction is organized by the order
of shadow banking financing instruments in Table 1. Shadow banks, the entities, are mentioned as
issuers when each instrument is introduced.
Shadow banks first come from the securitization. When a traditional commercial bank makes
a loan to a borrower, it keeps the loan as an asset on its balance sheet. If a commercial bank
securitizes its loans and sells them to investors, a shadow bank emerges. To sell its securitized
27The term ”liquid” is not equal to ”short-term”. For example, corporate bonds are long-term debt instruments but
considered liquid financial assets by individual investors.
28Runs stopped on September 19, 2008, three days after it started, when the U.S. government announced that it
would provide deposit insurance to investments in MMMFs.
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Table 2: Annual U.S. Household Liquid Financial Assets ($ billions, Percent)
Year Equity Deposits
Mutual Treasury Municipal
MMMF
Corporate
Total
Funds & Agency Bonds Bonds
2003
6, 973 4, 524 2, 674 762 626 909 670 17, 111
40.8% 26.4% 15.5% 4.5% 3.7% 5.3% 3.9% 100%
2004
7, 640 4, 941 3, 074 884 1, 514 878 601 19, 531
39.1% 25.3% 15.7% 4.5% 7.7% 4.5% 3.1% 100%
2005
8, 307 5, 311 3, 299 866 1, 630 926 810 21, 150
39.3% 25.1% 15.6% 4.1% 7.7% 4.4% 3.8% 100%
2006
10, 220 5, 789 3, 858 815 1, 687 1, 097 831 24, 297
42.1% 23.8% 15.9% 3.4% 6.9% 4.5% 3.4% 100%
2007
10, 075 6, 210 4, 343 919 1, 777 1, 343 1, 195 25, 862
39.0% 24.0% 16.8% 3.6% 6.9% 5.2% 4.6% 100%
2008
5, 601 6, 660 2, 795 1, 140 1, 916 1, 577 2, 150 21, 839
25.6% 30.5% 12.8% 5.2% 8.8% 7.2% 9.8% 100%
2009
7, 338 6, 798 3, 875 1, 154 1, 994 1, 306 1, 706 24, 171
30.4% 28.1% 16.0% 4.8% 8.2% 5.4% 7.1% 100%
2010
8, 704 6, 937 4, 503 1, 352 2, 073 1, 121 1, 332 26, 021
33.5% 26.7% 17.3% 5.2% 8.0% 4.3% 5.1% 100%
2011
8, 191 7, 605 4, 489 960 1, 969 1, 103 1, 325 25, 643
31.9% 29.7% 17.5% 3.7% 7.7% 4.3% 5.2% 100%
2012
9, 496 8, 114 5, 331 1, 113 1, 830 1, 119 1, 091 28, 094
33.8% 28.9% 19.0% 4.0% 6.5% 4.0% 3.9% 100%
2013
12, 649 8, 480 6, 340 1, 410 1, 839 1, 120 1, 087 32, 925
38.4% 25.8% 19.3% 4.3% 5.6% 3.4% 3.3% 100%
2014
14, 314 9, 063 6, 829 1, 060 1, 696 1, 033 1, 090 35, 085
40.8% 25.8% 19.5% 3.0% 4.8% 2.9% 3.1% 100%
2015
13, 837 9, 563 6, 758 1, 680 1, 642 1, 044 1, 144 35, 668
38.8% 26.8% 18.9% 4.7% 4.6% 2.9% 3.2% 100%
2016
15, 209 10, 187 7, 251 1, 847 1, 673 1, 023 846 38, 036
40.0% 26.8% 19.1% 4.9% 4.4% 2.7% 2.2% 100%
2017
17, 877 10, 331 8, 685 1, 882 1, 570 1, 054 456 41, 855
42.7% 24.7% 20.7% 4.5% 3.7% 2.5% 1.1% 100%
Households include nonprofit organizations. Liquid financial assets exclude such illiquid assets as pension
fund reserves, equity in the non-corporate business, etc. Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, L.101.
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loans, the commercial bank will set up a special purpose vehicle (henceforth, SPV), a bankruptcy
remotely subsidiary, to issue the securities. The SPV securities issuer is a shadow bank. Investors
are willing to buy the securities from the SPV but not the commercial bank because the failure
of the commercial bank will not affect the SPV and the securities. For the commercial bank, it
gets money from selling its loans and it can lend the money again. For the SPV, if it can sell
the securities with no debt from investors, then it has no liquidity risks. It is a process of dis-
intermediation. Security investors will receive the payment from the borrower directly and it seems
as if investors lend their money to the borrower. In most cases, the securities have collateral in case
borrowers default. If the collateral is real estate, the securities are mortgage-backed securities
(henceforth, MBSs). For the other collateral, they are asset-backed securities (henceforth, ABSs).
Table 3: Annual U.S. Asset-Backed and Mortgage-Related Securities Outstanding ($ billions)
Year ABS Non-Agency MBS Agency MBS Total
2003 995 1, 366 4, 349 6, 710
2004 1, 100 1, 896 4, 405 7, 402
2005 1, 281 2, 556 4, 662 8, 499
2006 1, 657 3, 299 5, 091 10, 047
2007 1, 964 3, 585 5, 801 11, 349
2008 1, 830 3, 188 6, 279 11, 297
2009 1, 712 2, 716 6, 636 11, 065
2010 1, 508 2, 424 6, 835 10, 766
2011 1, 359 2, 128 6, 948 10, 434
2012 1, 280 1, 878 6, 960 10, 118
2013 1, 286 1, 703 7, 040 10, 028
2014 1, 349 1, 623 7, 219 10, 191
2015 1, 384 1, 528 7, 367 10, 278
2016 1, 397 1, 385 7, 638 10, 420
2017 1, 469 1, 299 8, 005 10, 773
2018 1, 677 1, 294 8, 089 11, 060
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
Table 3 shows the ABSs and MBSs outstanding in the United States from 2003 to 2018. Agency
MBSs are issued by GSEs such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. They should not be
confused with agency debentures. Agency debentures are the debt of GSEs, so they are financing
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instruments for GSEs. However, GSEs issue agency MBSs for business and they are not debt.
Shadow banks usually prefer to have more funds to issue MBSs or ABSs. Hence, they use the
shadow banking financing instruments listed in Table 1 to raise funds. For examples, GSEs issue
agency debentures to raise funds. One the asset side, shadow banks hold MBSs and ABSs before
they can sell them or use them as collateral to raise more funds such as repos. When shadow bank-
ing financing instruments collapsed during the Great Recession, shadow banks had to liquidate
their holdings of securitized assets. By contrast, commercial banks increased securitized assets
holdings because they had stable funding sources (He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010)). Be-
cause of the liquidation, the market value of ABSs and MBSs plunged over the crisis. Agency
MBSs were saved by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s $1.25 trillion program to purchase agency MBSs,
which commenced on January 5, 2009, and was completed on March 31, 2010. Nowadays, Agency
MBSs account for $8.089 trillion in total $11.06 trillion securitized assets maybe because investors
believe a government bailout will happen again when a crisis arrives.
2.1.1 Commercial Paper
Commercial paper includes ABCP, financial CP and corporate CP29. The maturity of CP is usually
between 1 and 90 days with an average at about 30 days, although it can legally be up to 270 days.
ABCP is relatively new compared to financial CP and corporate CP. It is issued by ABCP conduits
which are SPVs sponsored by large financial institutions. The assets of ABCP conduits are collat-
eral of ABCP and they are usually long-term MBSs and ABSs. Given the normal term structure
of interest rates, ABCP conduits can earn profits by holding long-term securitized assets and issu-
ing short-term ABCP as debt. The sponsoring financial institutions are mainly commercial banks
and they usually provide guarantees to ABCP investors in case ABCP conduits default. In Jan-
uary 2007, commercial banks (BHCs) accounted for $903 billion or 74.8% of ABCP outstanding.
According to Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013), regulatory arbitrage was another important
motive that BHCs set up ABCP conduits. ABCP conduits are off-balance sheet financing for com-
29For a more detailed introduction about CP during the Great Recession, see Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010).
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Table 4: Annual U.S. Commercial Paper Outstanding ($ billions)
Date ABCP Financial CP Corporate CP Total
2003 680 528 134 1, 341
2004 663 550 121 1, 334
2005 763 623 142 1, 529
2006 970 693 142 1, 806
2007 1, 059 772 175 2, 005
2008 764 783 192 1, 739
2009 558 597 148 1, 303
2010 403 547 125 1, 074
2011 370 543 167 1, 081
2012 317 479 197 993
2013 275 544 216 1, 034
2014 242 540 265 1, 047
2015 231 522 275 1, 028
2016 255 492 273 1, 020
2017 242 468 285 996
2018 238 548 301 1, 088
Source: Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release.
mercial banks. Although BHCs need to satisfy capital requirements based on consolidated balance
sheets, they could enjoy reduced regulatory capital if guarantees were skillfully structured before
the Great Recession. Most losses of ABCP conduits were undertaken by the commercial banks
instead of ABCP investors during the Great Recession. In June 2009, the Financial Accounting
Standard Board (FASB) announced the Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 166
and 167, amending existing accounting rules for the consolidation of securitization transactions.
The United States banking agencies clarified in September 2009 that depository institutions (com-
mercial banks) would have to hold normal regulatory capital against consolidated securitization
transactions and ABCP conduits. Hence, we can see that the ABCP outstanding continues to de-
cline after 2009 in Table 4.
Corporate CP is issued by large non-financial corporations. It has no collateral, so only corpo-
rations with good reputations can issue it. Compared to long-term bonds, corporate CP has fewer
issue costs. It also usually has a backup (credit) line from commercial banks in case corporations
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cannot reissue their CP in crisis times. Besides seeking loans from commercial banks, corporations
can also issue long-term bonds to replace the CP that they have difficulties reissuing. For example,
CP is an important source of financing for Coca Cola, representing about 30% of their liabilities in
2007. During the Great Recession, Coca Cola switched to alternative long-term financing, mostly
as a response to the reality that it could not reissue enough CP anymore. On March 3, 2009, Coca
Cola announced that it had sold $0.9 billion of five-year and $1.35 billion of ten-year notes to repay
its maturing CP. In table 2, we can see individual investors held much more corporate bonds during
the Great Recession (2008).
Financial CP is issued by large financial institutions. It also has no collateral. The main issuers
of financial CP are foreign financial institutions, accounting for $455 billion of total $772 billion
financial CP outstanding in 2007. Foreign financial institutions usually set up U.S. subsidiaries
to issue financial CP in the U.S. market. Other main issuers of financial CP are captive finance
companies. Captive finance companies are financial subsidiaries of manufacturers, with the pur-
pose of providing financing for the manufacturer. Others are shadow banks in the U.S. banking
sector. They could be commercial bank-related or independent. Commercial banks cannot legally
issue financial CP directly, but their BHCs can set up shadow banking subsidiaries to issue it. As
an example of independent shadow banks, Lehman Brothers was a main issuer of financial CP
and its bankruptcy triggered the following run on the financial CP market. Hence, most issuers of
financial CP are independent shadow banks and it is the reason why I choose financial CP as the
proxy for shadow banking financing instruments.
2.1.2 Tri-Party Repos
Repurchase Agreements have a similar process like collateralized borrowings, but investors have
more controls over the collateral. The collateral is exempted from the automatic stay, so an investor
in a repo can unilaterally enforce the termination provisions of the agreement as a result of a
bankruptcy filing by the counter-party. Hence, investors have fewer risks when purchasing repos
than when lending covered by collateral. In the tri-party repo market, a third party called a clearing
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bank acts as an intermediary and alleviates the administrative burden between two parties engaging
in a repo. Dealers issue repos in the tri-party repo market using their securitized asset holdings
as collateral. The largest dealers are primary dealers. Primary dealers are dealer banks that are
authorized to trade directly with the New York Fed. Most tri-party repos are overnight.
Table 5: Annual U.S. Tri-Party Repos Outstanding ($ billions)
Year Tri-Party Repos GCF Net Tri-Party Repos
2010 1, 717 333 1, 384
2011 1, 871 306 1, 565
2012 2, 064 293 1, 772
2013 1, 932 257 1, 675
2014 1, 781 202 1, 579
2015 1, 801 221 1, 580
2016 1, 788 179 1, 609
2017 1, 958 123 1, 835
2018 2, 103 134 1, 969
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
General collateral financing (GCF) in Table 5 are repos that trade between dealer banks. Be-
cause the FTQ circle model in this paper only considers the funds that flow from outside into the
shadow banking system, net repos outstanding without GCF should be used in my study. Unfortu-
nately, data before 2010 is unavailable.
2.1.3 Agency Debentures
Agency debentures are agency debt issued by GSEs. GSEs includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
Farm Credit, Federal Home Loan Bank, Farmer Mac, and Tennessee Valley Authority. Agency
debentures have no collateral, but GSEs have implicit government backup. From Table 6 we can
see that short-term debt plunged, but the long-term debt remained relatively stable during the Great
Recession30.
30The peak of short-term agency debentures was $1.124 trillion outstanding in 2008, and the volume fell to $652
billion in 2009, since runs on GSEs, the issuer of agency debentures, happened in the last quarter of 2008. Agency
debentures in Table 6 use the last quarter value in each year as annual data.
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Table 6: Annual U.S. Agency Debentures Outstanding ($ billions)
Year Short-Term Long-Term Total
2006 518 2, 114 2, 632
2007 832 2, 074 2, 906
2008 1, 124 2, 085 3, 208
2009 652 2, 074 2, 726
2010 567 1, 971 2, 538
2011 517 1, 810 2, 327
2012 460 1, 636 2, 096
2013 533 1, 525 2, 058
2014 636 1, 393 2, 029
2015 718 1, 278 1, 995
2016 552 1, 420 1, 972
2017 529 1, 406 1, 935
2018 544 1, 322 1, 865
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
2.2 Great Recession
In this section, I review how CP outstanding and deposits changed over the Great Recession. Fig-
ure 2 shows the weekly CP outstanding, total deposits and cash at commercial banks from Dec.
12, 2001, through Nov. 29, 2017. The gray-shaded area in Figure 2 is the time period of the Great
Recession. We can see the CP market had two prominent collapses during the Great Recession.
I label them as ABCP market collapse and Lehman’s Bankruptcy. The increase in deposits ac-
companied by the ABCP market collapse was not significant. Only a fraction of funds flew from
ABCP into deposits directly. The others flew into financial CP, corporate CP, repos, etc. According
to Figure 3, the ABCP market collapse happened on August 9, 2007. Financial CP and corporate
CP still increased after the ABCP market collapse. The financial CP market collapse happened
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, because Lehman Brothers was
a main issuer of financial CP. No prominent collapse happened in corporate CP market like other
two CP markets during the Great Recession. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers also triggered
runs on the repo market and MMMFs. Lehman Brothers was a primary dealer bank in the tri-party
repo market, and after knowing the portfolio of MMMFs had financial CP and repos from Lehman
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Figure 2: CP Outstanding, Deposits and Cash at Commercial Banks
The figure shows the weekly CP outstanding, total deposits and cash at commercial banks from Dec. 12,
2001, through Nov. 29, 2017. The gray-shaded area is the time period of the Great Recession (from Aug. 1,
2007, to Jun. 24, 2009). The ABCP market collapse was Aug. 9, 2007. Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep. 15,
2008. Source: Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release and CP release.
Brothers, MMMFs investors also withdrew their money from MMMFs. Hence, we observe an un-
precedented steep jump in deposits accompanied by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Investors
transferred their funds from shadow banks (CP and repos) to commercial banks (deposits).
From Figure 2, the cash31 holdings of commercial banks shows that commercial banks had
a relatively constant cash level before Lehman’s bankruptcy. Commercial banks always tried to
keep their cash at the level although their deposits continuously increased. The cash target did not
change even after the ABCP market collapse. It means commercial banks still did not keep the
31Cash includes reserves.
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Figure 3: ABCP, Financial CP and Corporate CP Outstanding
The figure shows ABCP, Financial CP and Corporate CP Outstanding from Dec. 12, 2001, through Nov.
29, 2017. The gray-shaded area is the time period of the Great Recession (from Aug. 1, 2007, to Jun. 24,
2009). The ABCP market collapse was Aug. 9, 2007. Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep. 15, 2008. Source:
Federal Reserve’s CP release.
increment of deposits as extra cash on hand after the beginning of the Great Recession. Things
changed after Lehman’s bankruptcy. Commercial banks kept almost all the increment of deposits
as extra cash on hand. Hence, the liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks likely
broke down after Lehman’s bankruptcy.
It is worth mentioning that CP outstanding should have been much lower if unprecedented
government bailouts did not happen during the Great Recession. Runs on MMMFs stopped on
September 19, 2008, three days after it started, when the U.S. government announced that it would
provide deposit insurance to investments in MMMFs. Although the MMMF outstanding stopped
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dropping, MMMFs still adjusted their portfolios by holding more T-Bills and deposits, and less
CP and repos. For the first time ever, the Federal Reserve decided to purchase CP directly like
investors. By early January 2009, the Federal Reserve was the single largest purchaser of CP and
owned CP worth $357 billion, or 22.4% of the market, through a variety of lending facilities.
3 Empirical Evidence: the FTQ Circle
From Section 2, we know that investors withdraw funds from commercial banks or shadow banks
is actually the decrease in commercial or shadow banking financing instruments. Hence, to test the
FTQ circle empirically, we first need to find empirical proxies for commercial and shadow banking
financing instruments. For commercial banking financing instruments, it is easy because deposits
are the only ones. For shadow banking financing instruments, we need to find an empirical counter-
party that only shadow banks can issue to raise funds, and what is more, the issuing shadow banks
are independent. It is especially difficult given that BHCs controlled much more shadow banks
after the Great Recession. This paper chooses financial CP outstanding as the proxy for shadow
banking financing instruments because only shadow banks can legally issue financial CP and main
issuers are independent foreign financial institutions.
According to Figure 4, foreign financial institutions have accounted for an increasing share of
financial CP outstanding over time. The financial CP outstanding issued by U.S.-owned financial
institutions falls from more than 60% in 2002 to less than 20% in 2017. Although I do not collect
data regarding how much financial CP outstanding issued by U.S. financial institutions are from
independent shadow banks, the volume is not small, especially before the Great Recession. Captive
finance companies, subsidiaries of non-financial large corporations, are main financial CP U.S.
issuers. They are independent shadow banks. In addition, before the Great Recession, independent
dealer banks such as Lehman Brothers were also main financial CP issuers. Hence, most financial
CP issuers have no relation with U.S. BHCs and they are competitors by offering similar fixed-
income products for investors in the FTQ circle. Deposits have lower interest rates and fewer
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Figure 4: The Percentage of Financial CP Outstanding from U.S. Financial Institutions
The figure shows the percentage of financial CP outstanding that is issued by the U.S. owned financial
institutions from Dec. 12, 2001, through Nov. 29, 2017. The gray-shaded area is the time period of the
Great Recession (from Aug. 1, 2007, to Jun. 24, 2009). The ABCP market collapse was Aug. 9, 2007.
Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep. 15, 2008. Source: Federal Reserve’s CP release.
risks than financial CP. Although there always exists some financial CP issued by shadow banking
subsidiaries of BHCs, it is just like the large time deposits in total deposits32. They do not change
qualitative results in empirical tests.
Another difficulty in empirical tests comes from the frequency of data. In principle, the blue
links 2©, 3©, and 4© in the FTQ circle occur in sequence. In reality, few investors hold plenty of
cash on hand for some days, and most money transfers in investors’ portfolios are executed elec-
32The large time deposits outstanding decreased over the Great Recession like shadow banking financing instru-
ments because they are uncovered.
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tronically and instantaneously, so it is difficult to observe the time-lag between the links 2© and
3©. Given weekly data used in this paper, we can think the substitution of deposits for financial CP
happens within each week when investors are more risk-sensitive. Hence, the negative correlation
between the change of deposits and that of financial CP outstanding is weekly concurrent. The
interest of this paper is not the time-lag between the links 2© and 3© but the observation of subse-
quent liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks. According to the FTQ circle, I
need high-frequency data to observe the link 4© that happens later after an increase in deposits, but
not too late for shadow banks to rebuild the liquidity. Given that the highest frequency observation
I could get from the data is weekly, the shadow banking financing instruments I pick to test should
have the average maturity above at least one week. Repos are not feasible because they are mostly
overnight. The link 4© in the FTQ circle may happen in a day. The liquidity backup from com-
mercial banks in a week may be too late for repos. However, financial CP has the average maturity
as about 30 days. Hence, the weekly data is enough to observe the link 4© in the FTQ circle if it
really exists. In addition, the timely liquidity backup is effective for shadow banks to rebuild the
liquidity.
After choosing the empirical proxies, we can simplify the FTQ circle into two predictions that
we need to test.
• Prediction 1: In each week, there exists a concurrent correlation between the change of
deposits and that of financial CP outstanding all the time. The concurrent correlation is
negative as shown by the links 2© and 3© in the FTQ circle.
• Prediction 2: In normal times, there exists a dynamic correlation between deposits and fi-
nancial CP outstanding inter-weekly. An increase in deposits leads to an increase in financial
CP outstanding in the following several weeks as shown by the link 4© in the FTQ circle. In
crisis times, the dynamic correlation breaks down.
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3.1 Methods and Data
I collect my data regarding commercial banks from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release.
Although data from the Call Reports contain much more detailed information about commercial
banks than H.8 data, the latter does offer the available highest frequency (weekly) look at com-
mercial banks. I choose the H.8 data regarding all domestically chartered commercial banks from
December 12, 2001, to November 29, 2017. Weekly data about financial CP are collected from
Federal Reserve’s CP release and matched to the H.8 data.
I separate my entire times series data into three windows: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. The
cutoff dates to split the period of the Great Recession are chosen arbitrarily. I choose August 1,
2007, one week before the ABCP market collapse, as the beginning of the crisis and June 24, 2009,
as the end of the crisis. In such a way, I have 100 data points for the crisis, and the financial CP
collapse is about in the middle of the crisis33. To test two predictions based on the FTQ circle, I
estimate a series of VARs, each using the data in the window pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis.
Because both time series of deposits and financial CP outstanding are non-stationary in all the
three windows and they are not co-integrated, I normalize them as follows:
gDe,t = ln(
Depositt
Depositt−1
) ∗ 100; gCP,t = ln( Financial CPtFinancial CPt−1 ) ∗ 100.
Time series of gDe,t and gCP,t are actually weekly growth rates and they are stationary in all the
three windows34. Table 7 shows the summary statistics for time series of gDe,t and gCP,t. We can
see the mean of the percentage change in deposits is highest in the crisis as 0.188, but the standard
deviation does not increase from the pre-crisis to the crisis. Hence, deposits have a stable high
33There exists a tradeoff in choosing the window crisis. If the chosen crisis is too short, observations in the crisis
may be too few to get significant regression coefficients. If the chosen crisis is too long, it may include excessive
noise. According to the nonprofit National Bureau of Economic Research (the official arbiter of U.S. recessions), the
Great Recession in the U.S. began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. My choice begins four months before
the official one so that it can include the ABCP market collapse. Qualitative results in this paper do not change if I use
the official time window.
34In some literature, the growth rate of deposits is defined by gDe,t = 100∗(Depositt−Depositt−1)/Depositt−1. For
the small absolute value of rDe,t = Depositt/Depositt−1, the two definitions are very close, because ln(1 + rDe,t) ≈
rDe,t. In this paper, I always use log-difference to calcultate growth rates, since it is symmetry, and consistent with the
forecast model in Section 4. Qualitative results in this paper do not change if I use the alternative definition.
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growth rate in the crisis. By contrast, the growth rate of financial CP outstanding has the lowest
mean and the highest volatility in the crisis.
Table 7: Summary Statistics for Weekly Growth Rates of Deposits and Financial CP (Per-
cent)
Window Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Pre-Crisis
gDe,t 294 0.132 1.062 −2.327 −0.595 0.864 3.241
gCP,t 294 0.113 1.638 −6.023 −0.900 1.228 5.234
Crisis
gDe,t 100 0.188 1.019 −2.094 −0.513 0.883 4.227
gCP,t 100 −0.313 2.824 −11.769 −1.691 1.169 10.456
Post-Crisis
gDe,t 440 0.118 0.745 −2.340 −0.392 0.631 2.216
gCP,t 440 −0.031 2.148 −7.396 −1.330 1.403 11.980
From Figure 5 and Table 8, we can see time series of gDe,t and gCP,t have negative correlation
coefficients all the time. However, it is not sufficient to justify Prediction 1 because there may exist
an endogeneity problem between the growth rate of deposits and that of financial CP outstanding.
To solve the possible endogeneity problem, I use VAR models that include two endogenous vari-
ables (gDe,t and gCP,t). I always choose the lag order as 4 in my VAR models because lag 4 means
4 weeks, and given that the average maturity of financial CP is 30 days, the liquidity backup after
4 weeks may not be effective in helping even if it exists35. The fitted VAR(4) model I estimate in
each time window has the following formula: gDe,t
gCP,t
 =
 φ01
φ02
+
 φ111 φ112
φ121 φ
1
22

 gDe,t−1
gCP,t−1
+
 φ211 φ212
φ221 φ
2
22

 gDe,t−2
gCP,t−2

+
 φ311 φ312
φ321 φ
3
22

 gDe,t−3
gCP,t−3
+
 φ411 φ412
φ421 φ
4
22

 gDe,t−4
gCP,t−4
+
 a1t
a2t
 .
Here, residuals
 a1t
a2t
 are a sequence of serially uncorrelated vectors with mean zero and co-
35According to information criteria (AIC and BIC), lag order 3 or 4 is usually optimal in the pre-crisis and the
post-crisis, but lag order 1 or 2 is optimal in the crisis.
32
variance matrix Σ =
 σ11 σ12
σ21 σ22
 if the VAR(4) model is correctly fitted. We can calculate the
correlation coefficient between residuals a1t and a2t using ρ12 = σ12/
√
σ11 ∗ σ22. If Prediction 1 is
true, then ρ12 is negative in all three time windows. To justify Prediction 2, we expect to find that
some of φ121, φ
2
21, φ
3
21 and φ
4
21 are significantly positive in the pre-crisis and the post-crisis, but not
significant in the crisis.
Figure 5: Concurrent Scatter Plots for Weekly Growth Rates of Deposits and Financial CP
Table 8: Concurrent Correlation Coefficients for Weekly Growth Rates of Deposits and Fi-
nancial CP and t-Test
Window Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
Correlation Coefficient −0.445 −0.276 −0.502
t-Value −8.498 −2.847 −12.140
df 292 98 438
p-Value 5.0E-16 0.003 2.2E-16
3.2 Results
Table 9 summarizes the VAR(4) results in all the three time windows. Let’s first look at the residu-
als at = (a1t, a2t). If the VAR(4) model is correctly fitted in any time window, residuals at should
have no autocorrelation and no heteroskedasticity. In the pre-crisis, the p-value of Ljung-Box test
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Table 9: VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Deposits and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t gCP,t gDe,t gCP,t gDe,t
gCP,t−1 0.028 −0.048 0.170 0.047 −0.166∗∗ 0.012
(0.062) (0.034) (0.113) (0.039) (0.054) (0.016)
gDe,t−1 0.567∗∗∗ −0.603∗∗∗ −0.225 −0.093 −0.154 −0.191∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.062) (0.325) (0.113) (0.183) (0.053)
gCP,t−2 0.115 −0.042 0.097 −0.050 0.104 −0.069∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.034) (0.114) (0.040) (0.055) (0.016)
gDe,t−2 0.709∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.616 0.026 0.751∗∗∗ −0.439∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.067) (0.323) (0.112) (0.175) (0.050)
gCP,t−3 0.044 −0.017 −0.105 0.004 −0.029 0.007
(0.062) (0.034) (0.114) (0.040) (0.056) (0.016)
gDe,t−3 0.554∗∗∗ −0.525∗∗∗ −0.105 −0.164 0.342 −0.336∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.069) (0.327) (0.114) (0.180) (0.052)
gCP,t−4 0.021 −0.048 0.039 0.024 0.149∗∗ −0.031∗
(0.062) (0.034) (0.110) (0.038) (0.054) (0.016)
gDe,t−4 0.117 −0.033 0.277 0.190 0.197 0.197∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.066) (0.319) (0.111) (0.183) (0.053)
const −0.172 0.367∗∗∗ −0.078 0.195 −0.153 0.207∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.057) (0.318) (0.111) (0.115) (0.033)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.157 0.406 0.122 0.156 0.104 0.378
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.389 0.042 0.078 0.087 0.367
Σ
2.347 −0.385 7.843 −0.972 4.228 −0.577
−0.385 0.696 −0.972 0.949 −0.577 0.350
ρ
1 −0.301 1 −0.356 1 −0.475
−0.301 1 −0.356 1 −0.475 1
Granger Causality 0.171 1.5E-09 0.595 0.303 1.4E-05 2.3E-05
at Ljung-Box Q2(10) 0.014 0.686 2.8E-05
a˜t Ljung-Box Q2(10) 0.087 0.118 2.2E-05
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Granger Causality is the p-value of excluding the variable. at Ljung-Box test is a portmanteau test for
autocorrelation in residuals. a˜t = at/σt are standardized residuals. a˜t Ljung-Box test is a portmanteau test
for heteroskedasticity in residuals.
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based on 10 lags of at is 0.014, so we can reject the null hypothesis that residuals at have no au-
tocorrelation at 5% significance level. However, because commercial banks have an incentive to
exaggerate their deposits when they report their financial statements quarterly, including seasonal
dummy variables (from lag 1 to lag 13) can raise adjusted R2 in equation gCP,t from 0.133 up to
0.213 and that in equation gDe,t from 0.389 to 0.540. The p-value of Ljung-Box test based on 10
lags of at jumps up from 0.014 to 0.243. In addition, the p-value of Ljung-Box test based on 10
lags of standardized residuals a˜t = at/σt rises from 0.087 to 0.270. Hence, considering seasonal
effects, the fitted model has no autocorrelation and no heteroskedasticity in the pre-crisis36. The
VAR(4) may also be correctly fitted in the crisis given large enough p-values of Ljung-Box tests
based on at and a˜t. By contrast, the residuals at are not well-behaved in the post-crisis. There may
exist missing variables that should be included in the model. Another possible reason is the model
structure has changed for the time span of the post-crisis. The post-crisis has 440 data points across
more than 8 years. I treat it as normal times in this section, but the dynamic correlation between
deposits and financial CP outstanding still breaks down in some periods of the post-crisis37. Any-
way, no crisis after 2009 is as prominent as the Great Recession. Hence, in this section, I ignore the
possible structural change in the post-crisis. The correlation coefficients between a1t and a2t are
−0.301, −0.356 and −0.475 in the three time windows. They further demonstrate that Prediction
1 is true all the time though they are larger than what we get in Table 8. The change of deposits
and the change of financial CP outstanding are concurrently negatively correlated.
In the pre-crisis, except for the intercept, only coefficients of the growth rate of deposits are sig-
nificant. For equation gCP,t, the coefficients of gDe,t−1, gDe,t−2 and gDe,t−3 are significantly positive.
Hence, an increase in deposits leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding in the following one
to three weeks, and shadow banks have enough time to rebuild the liquidity. It is worth mention-
ing that the dynamic correlation is unidirectional. The change of financial CP is affected by the
past movements of the change of deposits. However, past movements of the change of financial
36The estimation results of VAR(4) models with seasonal dummy variables are given if request. Qualitative results
do not change.
37For details, see Section 4.
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CP outstanding do not significantly affect the change of deposits, even though the two series have
substantial concurrent negative correlation. From the Granger causality tests, we can also see that
the change of deposits Granger causes that of financial CP outstanding, but the change of latter
does not Granger cause that of deposits. Hence, commercial banks dominate the market in the
pre-crisis.
In the crisis, no coefficient is significant at all. Actually, according to the F-test of the whole
model (not reported in Table 9), two equations about gCP,t and gDe,t are not significant. Hence, no
dynamic correlation between deposits and financial CP outstanding exists. The liquidity backup
shown by the link 4© in the FTQ circle breaks down.
In the post-crisis, the dynamic correlation between deposits and financial CP outstanding
emerges again. For equation gCP,t, the coefficient of gDe,t−2 is significantly positive. Hence, an
increase in deposits leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding in the following two weeks.
The dynamic correlation is not unidirectional anymore although the significant coefficients of the
change of financial CP outstanding on the change of deposits are relatively small (−0.069 and
−0.031).
In summary, Prediction 2 is also proved by the results of VAR(4) models.
3.3 Other Variables of Commercial Banks
In this subsection, I estimate VAR(4) models for some other variables of commercial banks and
financial CP outstanding. On the liability side, besides deposits, large time deposits are also an
interesting variable. They are uncovered by deposit insurance. During the Great Recession, the
volume of large time deposits decreased like financial CP. Thus, I expect the concurrent negative
correlation between large time deposits and financial CP outstanding still exists but weaker than
deposits, given that commercial banks and independent shadow banks are competitors. However,
commercial banks are not willing to use the increase in large time deposits as the liquidity backup
to shadow banks because of the high risks. The dynamic correlation between large time deposits
and financial CP outstanding does not exist all the time. On the asset side, I estimate VAR(4)
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Table 10: VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Large Time Deposits and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gLTDe,t gCP,t gLTDe,t gCP,t gLTDe,t
gCP,t−1 0.009 −0.013 0.245∗ −0.045 −0.147∗∗ 0.037∗
(0.061) (0.039) (0.109) (0.050) (0.048) (0.017)
gLTDe,t−1 0.144 −0.183∗∗ 0.242 0.115 −0.247 0.083
(0.094) (0.060) (0.244) (0.112) (0.138) (0.049)
gCP,t−2 0.043 0.031 0.083 −0.005 −0.016 −0.004
(0.060) (0.038) (0.108) (0.049) (0.049) (0.017)
gLTDe,t−2 0.236∗ −0.157∗ −0.660∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.221 0.067
(0.094) (0.061) (0.235) (0.108) (0.138) (0.049)
gCP,t−3 −0.036 0.031 −0.193 0.012 −0.078 −0.012
(0.060) (0.038) (0.107) (0.049) (0.049) (0.017)
gLTDe,t−3 0.219∗ −0.150∗ −0.327 −0.249∗ 0.003 0.050
(0.095) (0.061) (0.238) (0.109) (0.138) (0.049)
gCP,t−4 0.014 −0.023 0.078 0.038 0.141∗∗ −0.022
(0.060) (0.039) (0.107) (0.049) (0.048) (0.017)
gLTDe,t−4 −0.202∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.583∗ 0.088 0.277∗ 0.077
(0.095) (0.061) (0.247) (0.113) (0.137) (0.049)
const 0.036 0.244∗∗∗ −0.198 0.017 −0.016 −0.018
(0.104) (0.067) (0.280) (0.128) (0.101) (0.036)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.075 0.127 0.179 0.260 0.068 0.041
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.102 0.103 0.192 0.050 0.023
Σ
2.575 −0.321 7.338 −1.102 4.397 −0.247
−0.321 1.061 −1.102 1.542 −0.247 0.551
ρ
1 −0.194 1 −0.328 1 −0.159
−0.194 1 −0.328 1 −0.159 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 11: VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Cash and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gCash,t gCP,t gCash,t gCP,t gCash,t
gCP,t−1 0.009 0.009 0.227∗ 0.173 −0.140∗∗ 0.047
(0.059) (0.203) (0.106) (0.304) (0.050) (0.093)
gCash,t−1 0.062∗∗∗ −0.826∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.356∗∗∗ −0.033 −0.277∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.058) (0.036) (0.104) (0.027) (0.050)
gCP,t−2 −0.001 0.314 0.135 0.044 0.021 0.043
(0.058) (0.201) (0.106) (0.306) (0.050) (0.094)
gCash,t−2 0.067∗∗∗ −0.505∗∗∗ −0.058 0.073 0.074∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.067) (0.038) (0.109) (0.027) (0.050)
gCP,t−3 −0.038 −0.411∗ −0.141 −0.309 −0.091 0.319∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.203) (0.106) (0.305) (0.050) (0.093)
gCash,t−3 0.100∗∗∗ −0.586∗∗∗ −0.013 0.042 −0.020 −0.147∗∗
(0.019) (0.067) (0.038) (0.109) (0.027) (0.051)
gCP,t−4 0.090 −0.684∗∗∗ 0.047 −0.632∗ 0.126∗ −0.072
(0.059) (0.204) (0.105) (0.303) (0.050) (0.093)
gCash,t−4 0.068∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗ 0.062 0.157 −0.011 0.095
(0.017) (0.058) (0.036) (0.104) (0.026) (0.049)
const 0.114 −0.066 −0.193 0.942 −0.026 0.270
(0.093) (0.321) (0.304) (0.877) (0.101) (0.188)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.110 0.513 0.128 0.233 0.079 0.167
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.500 0.048 0.163 0.061 0.151
Σ
2.478 −1.137 7.790 −1.806 4.345 −2.206
−1.137 29.342 −1.806 64.612 −2.206 15.189
ρ
1 −0.133 1 −0.081 1 −0.272
−0.133 1 −0.081 1 −0.272 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 12: VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Liquid Assets and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gLAsset,t gCP,t gLAsset,t gCP,t gLAsset,t
gCP,t−1 0.015 0.072 0.253∗ 0.004 −0.140∗∗ 0.032
(0.060) (0.065) (0.106) (0.091) (0.050) (0.037)
gLAsset,t−1 0.108 −0.531∗∗∗ 0.205 −0.271∗ −0.067 −0.279∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.060) (0.121) (0.104) (0.070) (0.051)
gCP,t−2 −0.018 0.130∗ 0.135 0.001 0.037 −0.006
(0.059) (0.064) (0.107) (0.092) (0.051) (0.037)
gLAsset,t−2 0.082 −0.312∗∗∗ −0.170 0.097 0.225∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.064) (0.121) (0.104) (0.070) (0.051)
gCP,t−3 −0.032 −0.075 −0.167 −0.244∗∗ −0.094 0.118∗∗
(0.060) (0.065) (0.106) (0.092) (0.050) (0.037)
gLAsset,t−3 0.262∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.086 0.035 −0.029 −0.162∗∗
(0.059) (0.064) (0.120) (0.103) (0.071) (0.051)
gCP,t−4 0.043 −0.044 0.093 −0.153 0.126∗ −0.034
(0.060) (0.065) (0.107) (0.092) (0.050) (0.037)
gLAsset,t−4 0.099 −0.011 0.184 0.185 −0.018 0.073
(0.056) (0.061) (0.119) (0.102) (0.068) (0.049)
const 0.064 0.172 −0.231 0.243 −0.042 0.258∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.104) (0.299) (0.258) (0.104) (0.075)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.084 0.329 0.151 0.212 0.082 0.178
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.310 0.073 0.139 0.064 0.162
Σ
2.552 −0.409 7.590 −0.415 4.331 −0.959
−0.409 3.003 −0.415 5.622 −0.959 2.284
ρ
1 −0.148 1 −0.064 1 −0.305
−0.148 1 −0.064 1 −0.305 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 13: VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Assets and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gAsset,t gCP,t gAsset,t gCP,t gAsset,t
gCP,t−1 0.003 0.010 0.216∗ 0.012 −0.154∗∗ 0.014
(0.061) (0.023) (0.106) (0.028) (0.052) (0.012)
gAsset,t−1 0.419∗ −0.412∗∗∗ −0.049 −0.095 −0.426 −0.223∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.061) (0.416) (0.111) (0.224) (0.051)
gCP,t−2 0.012 0.027 0.098 −0.003 0.064 −0.024∗
(0.061) (0.023) (0.107) (0.029) (0.052) (0.012)
gAsset,t−2 0.515∗∗ −0.195∗∗ −1.111∗∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.064) (0.417) (0.111) (0.219) (0.050)
gCP,t−3 −0.040 0.029 −0.129 −0.002 −0.072 0.025∗
(0.061) (0.023) (0.106) (0.028) (0.052) (0.012)
gAsset,t−3 0.583∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.023 0.060 0.130 −0.274∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.064) (0.423) (0.113) (0.222) (0.050)
gCP,t−4 0.036 −0.018 0.103 −0.0002 0.153∗∗ −0.021
(0.061) (0.023) (0.104) (0.028) (0.051) (0.011)
gAsset,t−4 0.178 0.053 1.228∗∗ 0.100 0.191 0.165∗∗
(0.166) (0.061) (0.419) (0.112) (0.222) (0.050)
const −0.141 0.266∗∗∗ −0.196 0.092 −0.076 0.119∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.044) (0.304) (0.081) (0.107) (0.024)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.067 0.243 0.189 0.133 0.108 0.268
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.222 0.115 0.053 0.091 0.254
Σ
2.598 −0.229 7.244 −0.566 4.208 −0.360
−0.229 0.357 −0.566 0.518 −0.360 0.216
ρ
1 −0.238 1 −0.292 1 −0.378
−0.238 1 −0.292 1 −0.378 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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models for cash, liquid assets and (total) assets with financial CP outstanding respectively38. When
investors make deposits from commercial banks, on one hand, deposits are the debt of commercial
banks. On the other hand, deposits are the cash of commercial banks if they keep the cash on hand.
If I replace deposits with cash in the VAR(4) models, I should have the same qualitative results as
Table 9. It means in a week, when there is an increase in deposits, commercial banks would keep
the deposits as cash on hand but not lend them. In the following weeks, the cash goes to shadow
banks if no crisis happens. If within one week, cash does not increase when there is an increase in
deposits, my story is not valid even though the fact of two predictions exists in deposits. I calculate
the growth rates as follows:
gLTDe,t = ln(
Large Time Depositt
Large Time Depositt−1
) ∗ 100; gCash,t = CashtCasht−1 ∗ 100;
gLAsset,t = ln(
Liquid Assett
Liquid Assett−1
) ∗ 100; gAsset,t = AssettAssett−1 ∗ 100;
Table 10 shows the regression results for large time deposits. As we expected, the concurrent
correlation between the change of large time deposits and that of financial CP outstanding is still
negative all the time, although they are weaker than the case of deposits. The dynamic correlation
is more subtle. In the crisis, an increase in large time deposits can even lead to a decrease in
financial CP outstanding. It could be the liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)). In
normal times, we can see the change of commercial banks’ attitudes towards large time deposits. In
the pre-crisis, liquidity backup from large time deposits happens in two or three weeks, but in the
post-crisis, it only happens in four weeks. Commercial banks are more prudent to offer liquidity
backup that comes from the increase in large time deposits. After the Great Recession, commercial
banks realize that large time deposits possess more liquidity risks than they thought before.
From Table 11 and Table 12, we can see the results for cash and liquid assets are similar to
the case of deposits in normal times. Regression results (not reported in the paper) also show
that the change of cash and that of deposits have strong positive concurrent correlation within one
38Liquid assets include cash and securities.
41
week. Hence, within one week, commercial banks keep most increment of deposits as cash on
hand. Things change in the crisis. Not only gCash,t and gLAsset,t do not Granger cause gCP,t, but
also absolute values of correlation coefficients of residuals are relatively small with −0.081 from
residuals of gCash,t and gCP,t, and −0.064 from residuals of gLAsset,t and gCP,t. For (total) assets,
the correlation coefficient of residuals of gAsset,t and gCP,t is −0.292, and it is nearly as low as the
case of deposits. Within one week, which is a relatively short term, when there is a decrease in
financial CP outstanding, there is an increase in deposits, and total assets also have to keep up with
the corresponding change of deposits because of the accounting equation. However, commercial
banks may no longer keep the increase in deposits as cash or liquid asset on hand within one week
given the relatively insignificant concurrent correlations shown before.
3.4 Robustness Tests
To simplify the analysis, I only include two endogenous variables in VAR(4) models before. Al-
though the residuals are well-behaved, potentially omitted variables are worth further studies in
case I ignore some possible crucial relations. In this subsection, I estimate VAR(4) models with
three endogenous variables: the growth rate of deposits (gDe,t), the growth rate of financial CP
outstanding (gCP,t) and one of the potentially omitted variables. The potentially omitted variables
considered in this paper are about interest rates. If deposits and financial CP outstanding are sales
quantities of commercial and shadow banking financing products, interest rates are prices. Because
different commercial banks have different interest rates, and there are different kinds of deposits,
it is difficult to find a proxy for interest rates of total deposits. I first consider the 3-month T-Bill
rate as the potentially omitted variable. T-Bills are similar to covered deposits in that they are de-
fault risk-free fixed-income products. If commercial banks match the interest rates of their deposits
against the T-Bill rate, an increase in the T-Bill rate could lead to an increase in deposits. In weekly
data, T-Bills and deposits are more likely substitutes. Hence, I expect an increase in the T-Bill rate
to lead to a decrease in deposits. Next, the spread (Paper-TBill) between the 3-month AA-rated
financial CP rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate could possibly explain the change of financial CP
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Table 14: Robustness Tests for Omitted Variables
Potentially Omitted Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
Variable (top row) Granger Instant Granger Instant Granger Instant
(1)
∆T-Bill,t
0.753 0.858 2.397 5.234 1.558 4.074
(0.645) (0.651) (0.017) (0.073) (0.133) (0.130)
gDe,t
6.893 23.799 1.339 13.540 3.437 82.149
(8.3E-09) (6.8E-06) (0.225) (0.001) (0.001) (2.2E-16)
(2)
∆Paper-TBill,t
0.630 0.843 2.444 10.507 0.264 0.006
( 0.753) (0.656) (0.015) (0.005) (0.977) (0.997)
gDe,t
8.057 24.525 1.113 8.040 4.157 80.412
(1.6E-10) (4.7E-06) (0.355) (0.018) (6.4E-05) (2.2E-16)
(3)
∆Libor-OIS,t
2.751 1.860 2.806 15.928 0.579 3.384
( 0.005) (0.395) (0.005) (3.5E-04) (0.796) (0.184)
gDe,t
6.694 20.659 0.756 18.705 3.752 82.330
(1.6E-08) (3.3E-05) (0.642) (8.7E-05) (2.4E-04) (2.2E-16)
(4)
∆OIS-TBill,t
1.132 1.034 3.169 3.655 0.757 1.902
(0.339) (0.596) (0.002) (0.161) (0.641) (0.386)
gDe,t
7.220 24.069 1.397 10.098 3.562 81.879
(2.8E-09) (5.9E-06) (0.198) (0.006) (4.3E-04) (2.2E-16)
Granger and Instantaneous causality tests for VAR(4)s with three endogenous variables: the growth rate
of deposits (gDe,t), the growth rate of financial CP outstanding (gCP,t) and one of the potentially omitted
variables. The potential omitted variables are (1) ∆T-Bill,t: the weekly change in the 3-month T-Bill rate;
(2) ∆Paper-TBill,t: the weekly change in the spread between the 3-month AA-rated financial CP rate and the
3-month T-Bill rate; (3) ∆Libor-OIS,t: the weekly change in spread between the 3-month London inter-bank
offered rate and the 3-month overnight indexed swap rate; (4) ∆OIS-TBill,t: the weekly change in the spread
between the 3-month overnight indexed swap rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate. The table reports the F-Test
statistics and p-values (in parentheses) testing the null that the variable on the left side does not Granger
cause the other two variables in Granger columns. In addition, it also reports the χ2 statistics and p-values
(in parentheses) testing the null that the variable on the left side does not instantaneously cause the other
two variables in Instant columns. All statistics that are significant at the 5% significance level are in bold.
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outstanding. An increase in the Paper-TBill spread means not only a higher return rate but also
higher liquidity and potential credit risks in the investment of financial CP. If investors perceive
the return more than risks, then a positive concurrent or dynamic correlation may exist between
the change of spread and gCP,t. In the other case, if the large spread is offered by shadow banks
when they have difficulties in rolling over their debt, then it reflects more about the liquidity and
potential credit risks.
In addition to the T-Bill rate and the Paper-TBill spread, risks in the whole banking sector are
also crucial to the transfer of funds between deposits and financial CP. Intuitively, when the risks
increase, investors prefer to invest more in deposits and less in financial CP, and vice versa. In
most of the literature, the spread (a.k.a. TED spread) between the 3-month London inter-bank
offered (henceforth, Libor) rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate is used as the proxy for the risks. In
this paper, I further subdivide the TED spread into two parts: (1) the spread (Libor-OIS) between
the 3-month Libor rate and the 3-month overnight indexed swap (henceforth, OIS) rate which is a
proxy for credit risks; (2) the spread (OIS-TBill) between 3-month OIS rate and the 3-month T-Bill
rate which is a proxy for liquidity risks.
In order to save space, I first report Granger and Instantaneous causality tests for VAR(4)s
that include one more potentially omitted variable respectively in Table 14. If an omitted variable
indeed significantly influences gDe,t and gCP,t, I report detailed results of regressions including the
variable next. Statistics and p-values (in parentheses) testing the null that the variable on the left
side does not Granger or instantaneously cause the other two variables are shown in Table 1439.
The Granger causality tests check the significance of dynamic correlations, and the Instantaneous
causality tests check that of concurrent correlations. From Table 14, we can see the concurrent
correlation between the growth rate of deposits and the growth rate of financial CP outstanding in
Prediction 1 always exists, even if I include one of the potentially omitted variables in the VAR(4)
models40. Besides, the dynamic correlation between the growth rate of deposits and the growth
39I also test the effective federal funds rate, which is a proxy for the interest rate of deposits, to see if it is a
potentially omitted variable. However, it is insignificant all the time and has almost no effect on deposits and financial
CP outstanding. I drop it to save space.
40In this paper, I use first differences but not log-difference growth rates for all interest rates because some interest
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rate of financial CP outstanding exists in normal times but breaks down in the crisis like Prediction
2 after I consider the potentially omitted variables.
Except for the Libor-OIS spread, no potentially omitted variable has significant dynamic or
concurrent correlations with gDe,t and gCP,t in normal times, but they are indeed worth being in-
cluded in the models when the crisis happens. In normal times, the prices of deposits and financial
CP, and the liquidity risks in the banking sector are totally endogenously decided by gDe,t and gCP,t.
The credit risks in the banking sector (Libor-OIS spread) have significant dynamic explanatory
power in the pre-crisis, but the power disappears in the post-crisis. By contrast, the potentially
omitted variables are exogenously decided in the crisis. From Figure 6, we can see that spreads
widen in the crisis, and it is very likely unexpected to commercial banks and shadow banks. Hence,
all potentially omitted variables have explanatory power in the crisis.
Table 15 shows the estimation results of VAR(4) that includes the Libor-OIS spread in the pre-
crisis. As we expected, an increase in the credit risks of the banking sector leads to an increase in
deposits and a decrease in financial CP outstanding in two weeks. The results of VAR(4)s include
each potentially omitted variable in the crisis are reported in Table 16, 17, 18, and 19 respectively.
During the Great Recession, gDe,t and ∆T-Bill,t are concurrently negatively correlated, and an in-
crease in T-Bill rates leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding and a decrease in deposits,
since deposits and T-Bills are substitutes. gCP,t and ∆Paper-TBill,t are concurrently negatively cor-
related, and an increase in Paper-TBill spread leads to a decrease in financial CP outstanding. It
proves that in the crisis, shadow banks have difficulties to reissue their financial CP even if they
offer high additional interest rates. Investors perceive the high additional return of financial CP as
high risks. Finally, investors transfer their funds from financial CP to deposits when the banking
sector has increases in credit risks (Libor-OIS spread) and liquidity risks (OIS-TBill spread) in the
crisis. As to concurrent correlations, ∆Libor-OIS,t is negatively correlated with gCP,t and positively
correlated with gDe,t, but ∆OIS-TBill,t is only positively correlated with gDe,t. Hence, investors do not
think liquidity risks have an instant negative influence on financial CP like credit risks.
rates are negative. Qualitative results do not change if I first add a constant value to interest rates and then transform
them into log-difference growth rates.
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Figure 6: The Spreads
The figure shows the spreads from Dec. 12, 2001, through Nov. 29, 2017. Paper-TBill: the spread between
the 3-month AA-rated financial CP rates and the 3-month T-Bill rates. Libor-OIS: the spread between the
3-month London inter-bank offered rates and the 3-month overnight indexed swap rates. OIS-TBill: the
spread between the 3-month overnight indexed swap rates and the 3-month T-Bill rates. The gray-shaded
area is the time period of the Great Recession (from Aug. 1, 2007, to Jun. 24, 2009). The ABCP market
collapse was Aug. 9, 2007. Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep. 15, 2008. Source: Federal Reserve’s CP release,
Bloomberg, U.S. Treasury.
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Table 15: VAR(4) Includes the Libor-OIS Spread in the Pre-Crisis
Pre-Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆Libor-OIS,t
gCP,t−1 0.019 −0.035 −0.001
(0.063) (0.034) (0.001)
gDe,t−1 0.593∗∗∗ −0.635∗∗∗ −0.003∗
(0.116) (0.062) (0.001)
∆Libor-OIS,t−1 −3.271 2.329 0.299∗∗∗
(5.293) (2.840) (0.058)
gCP,t−2 0.092 −0.027 0.0001
(0.063) (0.034) (0.001)
gDe,t−2 0.717∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.127) (0.068) (0.001)
∆Libor-OIS,t−2 −13.449∗ 8.093∗∗ −0.039
(5.486) (2.944) (0.061)
gCP,t−3 0.029 −0.005 0.0001
(0.062) (0.033) (0.001)
gDe,t−3 0.539∗∗∗ −0.527∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.132) (0.071) (0.001)
∆Libor-OIS,t−3 2.372 4.006 −0.165∗∗
(5.566) (2.987) (0.061)
gCP,t−4 0.025 −0.047 0.001∗
(0.062) (0.033) (0.001)
gDe,t−4 0.123 −0.035 0.001
(0.123) (0.066) (0.001)
∆Libor-OIS,t−4 −5.027 1.455 −0.133∗
(5.360) (2.876) (0.059)
const −0.176 0.375∗∗∗ 0.00004
(0.106) (0.057) (0.001)
Observations 290 290 290
R2 0.183 0.441 0.217
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.417 0.183
ρ
1 −0.275 −0.072
−0.275 1 −0.015
−0.072 −0.015 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 16: VAR(4) Includes the T-Bill Rate in the Crisis
Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆T-Bill,t
gCP,t−1 0.166 0.054 −0.014
(0.114) (0.039) (0.009)
gDe,t−1 −0.376 −0.102 −0.017
(0.343) (0.116) (0.026)
∆T-Bill,t−1 0.591 0.416 −0.057
(1.424) (0.481) (0.107)
gCP,t−2 0.139 −0.035 −0.008
(0.116) (0.039) (0.009)
gDe,t−2 −0.424 −0.047 −0.057∗
(0.340) (0.115) (0.025)
∆T-Bill,t−2 3.532∗ −1.351∗∗ −0.153
(1.393) (0.471) (0.104)
gCP,t−3 −0.094 0.002 −0.005
(0.114) (0.038) (0.009)
gDe,t−3 −0.063 −0.145 −0.005
(0.332) (0.112) (0.025)
∆T-Bill,t−3 −1.413 −0.463 0.052
(1.453) (0.491) (0.109)
gCP,t−4 0.063 0.003 0.004
(0.110) (0.037) (0.008)
gDe,t−4 0.420 0.104 −0.022
(0.323) (0.109) (0.024)
∆T-Bill,t−4 0.187 −0.947 −0.083
(1.473) (0.498) (0.110)
const 0.029 0.110 −0.033
(0.326) (0.110) (0.024)
Observations 96 96 96
R2 0.196 0.270 0.127
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.165 0.0003
ρ
1 −0.337 0.026
−0.337 1 −0.233
0.026 −0.233 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 17: VAR(4) Includes the Paper-TBill Spread in the Crisis
Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆Paper-TBill,t
gCP,t−1 0.004 0.087∗ 0.020
(0.118) (0.044) (0.015)
gDe,t−1 −0.104 −0.111 0.064
(0.306) (0.113) (0.039)
∆Paper-TBill,t−1 −2.324∗ 0.657 −0.068
(0.895) (0.332) (0.114)
gCP,t−2 0.048 −0.041 −0.008
(0.120) (0.045) (0.015)
gDe,t−2 −0.496 −0.012 0.049
(0.306) (0.113) (0.039)
∆Paper-TBill,t−2 −3.034∗∗ 0.470 −0.055
(0.899) (0.333) (0.114)
gCP,t−3 −0.077 0.008 0.032∗
(0.114) (0.042) (0.014)
gDe,t−3 −0.024 −0.183 0.014
(0.306) (0.113) (0.039)
∆Paper-TBill,t−3 −1.163 0.286 0.108
(0.947) (0.352) (0.120)
gCP,t−4 0.135 0.006 −0.002
(0.110) (0.041) (0.014)
gDe,t−4 0.436 0.168 0.027
(0.300) (0.111) (0.038)
∆Paper-TBill,t−4 0.690 0.087 −0.023
(0.914) (0.339) (0.116)
const −0.236 0.234∗ −0.034
(0.302) (0.112) (0.038)
Observations 96 96 96
R2 0.276 0.208 0.130
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.093 0.004
ρ
1 −0.301 −0.349
−0.301 1 0.077
−0.349 0.077 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 18: VAR(4) Includes the Libor-OIS Spread in the Crisis
Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆Libor-OIS,t
gCP,t−1 0.081 0.051 −0.016∗
(0.111) (0.041) (0.007)
gDe,t−1 0.371 −0.225 0.003
(0.336) (0.125) (0.020)
∆Libor-OIS,t−1 −6.873∗∗ 1.754∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(2.065) (0.770) (0.122)
gCP,t−2 −0.020 −0.023 0.00001
(0.119) (0.044) (0.007)
gDe,t−2 −0.128 −0.033 0.008
(0.337) (0.126) (0.020)
∆Libor-OIS,t−2 −2.745 −0.087 0.025
(2.214) (0.825) (0.131)
gCP,t−3 −0.121 0.007 0.009
(0.119) (0.044) (0.007)
gDe,t−3 −0.171 −0.135 −0.001
(0.332) (0.124) (0.020)
∆Libor-OIS,t−3 3.360 −0.962 −0.220
(2.206) (0.822) (0.130)
gCP,t−4 0.212 −0.008 0.001
(0.115) (0.043) (0.007)
gDe,t−4 0.270 0.174 0.028
(0.312) (0.116) (0.018)
∆Libor-OIS,t−4 0.716 0.578 −0.053
(1.952) (0.728) (0.115)
const −0.304 0.234∗ −0.009
(0.311) (0.116) (0.018)
Observations 96 96 96
R2 0.291 0.217 0.415
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.104 0.330
ρ
1 −0.294 −0.186
−0.294 1 0.442
−0.186 0.442 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 19: VAR(4) Includes the OIS-TBill Spread in the Crisis
Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆OIS-TBill,t
gCP,t−1 0.123 0.076∗ 0.009
(0.112) (0.038) (0.007)
gDe,t−1 −0.251 −0.117 0.005
(0.333) (0.113) (0.020)
∆OIS-TBill,t−1 −2.346 −0.379 −0.103
(1.689) (0.576) (0.103)
gCP,t−2 0.108 −0.026 0.009
(0.115) (0.039) (0.007)
gDe,t−2 −0.385 −0.037 0.046∗
(0.329) (0.112) (0.020)
∆OIS-TBill,t−2 −5.386∗∗ 1.901∗∗ −0.142
(1.664) (0.567) (0.102)
gCP,t−3 −0.081 0.004 0.005
(0.113) (0.038) (0.007)
gDe,t−3 −0.076 −0.124 −0.017
(0.321) (0.109) (0.020)
∆OIS-TBill,t−3 −0.231 0.952 0.099
(1.768) (0.603) (0.108)
gCP,t−4 0.128 −0.008 −0.0002
(0.109) (0.037) (0.007)
gDe,t−4 0.465 0.106 −0.003
(0.310) (0.106) (0.019)
∆OIS-TBill,t−4 −1.938 1.238∗ −0.118
(1.784) (0.608) (0.109)
const −0.197 0.243∗ −0.015
(0.308) (0.105) (0.019)
Observations 96 96 96
R2 0.239 0.297 0.173
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.196 0.053
ρ
1 −0.290 −0.057
−0.290 1 0.199
−0.057 0.199 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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4 The Forecast Model: When Liquidity Backup Breaks Down
In Section 3, I mark out the time window of the Great Recession as the crisis in advance. The
VAR(4) model for gDe,t and gCP,t is not significant in the crisis. Although the crisis set has 100 data
points, it still could be too small to have significant results. In this section, I do not presume the
crisis times but let the data reveal them according to the FTQ circle. If my FTQ circle model is
correct, when the liquidity backup of the blue link 4© breaks down, it is the time that markets have
a crisis. How to find the specific time that the liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow
banks breaks down? The dynamic correlation between gDe,t and gCP,t stemming from the blue link
4© can help improve the prediction of future financial CP outstanding in normal times. An increase
in deposits leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding. Hence, to predict future financial
CP outstanding, including the past value of deposits is more accurate than using the past value of
financial CP outstanding alone. If including the past value of deposits cannot substantially increase
the accuracy of the prediction of financial CP outstanding, it means the dynamic correlation breaks
down, and it is the crisis time. I expect that the data will reveal the liquidity backup breaks down
during the most time of the Great Recession beforehand, or the FTQ circle model may be wrong.
Figure 7: One-Step Forward-Chaining Cross-Validation
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The time span I use to make predictions is longer than that I use to estimate the VAR(4) models
in Section 3. I collect weekly data regarding deposits and financial CP outstanding from January
3, 2001, to January 16, 2019. Totally, there are 942 observations. Figure 7 shows the one-step
forward-chaining cross-validation method I use to compare the prediction accuracy of different
models. Each training set (blue squares) has 60 data points, and the corresponding test set (red
circle) is the next observation after the training set. Hence, each model has to be estimated in
total 882 training sets respectively, and the 882 fitted models are used to predict the 882 test sets.
Finally, we have time series of 882 squared errors from the difference between the true value and
the predicted value in test sets for each model, and they are the measure to judge the prediction
accuracy of different models.
I set the size of training sets as fixed 60 data points even if there exist more historical data
when we predict relatively recent test sets. Although including more data points in training sets
can help estimate the yearly seasonality, the time series of squared errors will have a decreasing
trend because more recent test sets have more data points in their corresponding training sets. To
give a fair condition for each group of the training set and test set, I assume the 60 weeks Markov
property. Given 60 weeks in each training set, I ignore the yearly seasonality. However, it does not
undermine the analysis in this section because the goal of this section is not to find a model that
can best predict weekly financial CP outstanding but justify including past deposits can improve
the prediction in normal times.
For univariate models with only financial CP outstanding, a simple random walk with drift
model regarding the log value can give a good prediction according to the mean squared error
(henceforth, MSE) in test sets. Hence, the univariate model I use to predict financial CP outstand-
ing is:
Univariate Model: ln(Financial CPt+1) = d+ ln(Financial CPt) + t
where t is a normal i.i.d. error and financial CP outstanding is in million dollars. It is the same
as we usually assume the price of a stock follows the geometric Brownian motion. Complicated
univariate models like ARIMA-GARCH models or artificial neural networks models cannot sub-
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stantially reduce the MSE. The multivariate model including deposits I use to predict financial CP
outstanding is:
Multivariate Model:

ln(Financial CPt+1) = d1 + ln(Financial CPt) + 1t+
β[ln( ̂Depositst+1)− ln(Depositst)]
(1− γ1L13)[ln(Depositst+1)− ln(Depositst)] = d2 + (1− γ2L13)2t
where 1t and 2t are normal i.i.d. errors, and deposits and financial CP outstanding are in million
dollars. Compared to the univariate model, financial CP outstanding depends on not only the drift
and its value in last week but also the predicted deposits ( ̂Depositst+1). The predicted deposits
( ̂Depositst+1) are estimated by a seasonal random walk with drift model. The quarterly (13 weeks)
seasonality exists in deposits because commercial banks tend to exaggerate their deposits when
they report their financial statements every quarter41. It is the reason I cannot use the VAR model
to predict financial CP outstanding. Even seasonal VAR models cannot capture the seasonality in
deposits like the univariate seasonal model for deposits. Admittedly, the seasonal random walk
with drift model is not the best model to predict deposits. However, to achieve the goal in this
section, it is enough and straightforward. I only need to test if including deposits and keeping
all other things unchanged in the univariate model of financial CP outstanding can improve the
prediction accuracy in normal times.
Figure 8 shows 40 weeks moving averages of squared errors for univariate and multivariate
models. To make the MSE more readable, the squared error in Figure 8 is calculated as follows:
Squared Error = (ln(Financial CP)− ̂ln(Financial CP))2 ∗ 10000
where financial CP outstanding from test sets is in million dollars. Except for the four gray-shaded
columns, the multivariate model has fewer MSEs than the univariate model as we expected, which
means there exists a dynamic correlation between deposits and financial CP outstanding. The liq-
41Financial CP outstanding does not have quarterly seasonality alone.
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Figure 8: 40 Weeks Moving Averages of Squared Errors for Univariate and Multivariate
Models
The figure shows 40 weeks moving averages of squared errors for univariate and multivariate models. The
gray-shaded areas are the time periods when the multivariate MSE is larger the univariate MSE and therefore,
the possible crisis times. The first gray column is from Sep. 2007 to Apr. 2009 (the Great Recession).
The second and third gray columns are from Jan. 2010 to Apr. 2010 and from Sep. 2010 to May 2011,
respectively (the European debt crisis). The fourth gray column is from Jun. 2014 to Nov. 2014 (2014 Oil
price crash). Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep. 15, 2008. The gray line in the background is financial CP
outstanding (billion dollars) for reference only.
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uidity backup was broken from September 2007 to April 2009 first time as shown by the first gray
column. It is almost the generally accepted time period of the Great Recession. The second and
third gray columns are from January 2010 to April 2010 and from September 2010 to May 2011,
respectively. We know the European sovereign debt crisis peaked between 2010 to 2011. Foreign
financial institutions account for more than 75% of total financial CP outstanding after 2010 (Fig-
ure 4), and most of them are headquartered in Europe, so it is not hard to understand that U.S.
commercial banks stop the liquidity backup from increased deposits to European financial institu-
tions during the European debt crisis. According to my forecast model, there exists a mitigation
gap between the second and third gray columns. Further studies need to check if the crisis truly
mitigates between April 2010 to September 2010. The last gray column in Figure 8 is between
June 2014 to November 2014. Crude oil prices (Brent or WTI) plunged more than 50% in this
period. The more detailed reasons behind the breakdown of liquidity backup are still worth further
studies.
The model in this section is not for the financial crisis forecast. Commercial banks change
their strategies about the change of deposits when they realize a crisis is coming. Somehow, they
can forecast the arrival of a potential crisis using their risk management models. In addition,
the breakdown of liquidity backup does not necessarily result in the collapse of financial CP. We
only observe the prominent collapse following the Lehman’s Bankruptcy. Liquidity backup is a
guarantee for investors’ confidence. When it breaks down, a trigger such as a large impact of credit
risks may set off the collapse of financial CP.
5 Concluding Remarks
During the Great Recession, not all funds flew out from the banking system. Deposits increased,
but the volumes of all other short-term financing instruments decreased. Commercial banks that
relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing can still lend and purchase se-
curitized assets compared to other banks. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, commercial
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banks kept the unprecedentedly increased deposits as cash on hand, which could be crucial liquidity
backup for shadow banks (see Table 2). It may come from the counter-party risks or the first time
ever interest on reserves offered by Federal Reserves. Or sometimes, commercial banks would
rather squeeze their credit and acquire securitized assets at fire-sale price liquidated by shadow
banks than offer liquidity backup to high risky counter-parties (Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer
(2010)). Although there were unprecedented government bailouts after Lehman’s bankruptcy, se-
curitized assets have already been priced at extremely risk-averse preference from fixed-income
investors. Using their securitized assets as collateral, shadow banks cannot raise enough funds
like the time when securitized assets are in nearly risk-neutral pricing. No liquidity can arbitrage
securitized assets back to nearly risk-neutral pricing, and even if any, it takes a too long time to go
back, and survival could be a problem.
After the Great Recession, BHCs were potential winners and owned more and more shadow
banking subsidiaries. Although the number of independent shadow banks decreased, we have the
internal FTQ circle in BHCs. BHCs can enjoy the synergy by holding commercial banks and
shadow banks together. However, deposits may not be enough for some BHCs to resist the next
crisis. Funds will transfer from some BHCs to some other BHCs, and regulations should be able
to stimulate BHCs with rich liquidity to help BHCs in trouble but not stand by and profit from
the trouble. This paper also proposes that regulations should be concerned with not only sufficient
capital but also sufficient core deposits.
Nowadays, new kinds of shadow banks spring up. It is important to differentiate between
pure dis-intermediation and banking activities. For example, peer-to-peer lending is pure dis-
intermediation if the lending platform only channels funds from lenders to borrowers, and all risks
transfer from borrowers to lenders. However, lending platforms usually have their own liquidity
management and sometimes offer guarantees to investors for protection. The credit risk retention
can stimulate platforms to monitor borrowers, but it also brings about the liquidity risks given
that lending platforms are not pure platforms anymore. Another example of new rising shadow
banks is the mortgage lending company. Some mortgage lenders are ultimately funded by agency
57
MBSs. During the Great Recession, agency MBSs were saved by government bailouts. Agency
MBS investors may expect the implicit bailouts will happen again, so agency MBSs dominate
the securitized asset market today (Table 3). If agency MBSs suffer runs in the future, mortgage
lenders that rely on the agency MBS financing will suffer liquidity problems too. Even if the
government saves the agency MBSs again, taxpayers will undertake the final cost.
The FTQ circle model in this paper also gives wisdom in international finance. When a country
raises capital internationally, it can still have sufficient capital when normal fluctuation in the econ-
omy of the country happens. The capital outflow is offset by the inflow from the liquidity backup.
However, when a severe crisis happens inside the country, the liquidity problem may break out.
In reality, European financial institutions issue financial CP in the United States, and the liquidity
backup broke down during the European debt crisis.
Finally, there is one caveat: this paper only considers the liquidity risks and therefore, the liabil-
ity side of financial institutions. Most financial institutions failed in the Great Recession because of
their holdings of MBSs, especially subprime MBSs. When the prices of their assets (mostly MBSs)
declined, financial institutions could be insolvent even with no liquidity problem. The neglected
credit risks and bubbles in prices of collateral (mostly real estate) largely account for the price
decline of securitized assets. Liquidity risks also play a role in explaining the price decline. As the
story in this paper, when the liquidity backup from commercial banks broke down, shadow banks
could not roll over their debt and had to liquidate their securitized assets. The liquidation leads
to the further price decline of MBSs. Excluding the neglected credit risks and bubbles, MBSs are
priced from nearly risk-neutral to extremely risk-averse valuation because extremely risk-averse
investors dominate the markets. It is hard to say that the failed financial institutions hold a large
number of MBSs intentionally or they cannot resell the MBSs they issued or underwrote. From a
risk-neutral perspective, their holdings of MBSs may be correct, but they cannot survive into the
time when markets are full of liquidity and dominated by nearly risk-neutral arbitragers again.
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